Rural-urban land conversion is currently a common social economic phenomenon during the process of economic development and rural urbanization in China. Rural-urban land conversion is positively effective as far as so...Rural-urban land conversion is currently a common social economic phenomenon during the process of economic development and rural urbanization in China. Rural-urban land conversion is positively effective as far as social and economic benefits are concerned (Yang, 2002), but its negative effect is also evident, resulting in such problems as low efficiency of rural land configuration and loss of social welfare. Consequently, farm-ers should also have an equal chance to enjoy the social welfare enhanced by land conversion. Based on the theories of welfare economy, this paper puts forward policy suggestions by discussing the welfare changes of various interest groups, builds the model of welfare distribution, and analyzes the conditions of maximizing social welfare. The absolute and opposite value of social welfare is closely related with the speed of rural-urban land conversion, and governments should give farmers and collectives fair compensa-tion to make up for the utility loss caused by land expropriation, which are conclusions drawn from this paper. This study aims to provide a theoretical basis for regulating targets and evaluation criteria, realizing the mechanism and implementation of public po-lices during rural-urban land conversion.展开更多
To solve the choice of multi-objective game's equilibria,we construct general bargaining games called self-bargaining games,and define their individual welfare functions with three appropriate axioms.According to ...To solve the choice of multi-objective game's equilibria,we construct general bargaining games called self-bargaining games,and define their individual welfare functions with three appropriate axioms.According to the individual welfare functions,we transform the multi–objective game into a single-objective game and define its bargaining equilibrium,which is a Nash equilibrium of the single-objective game.And then,based on certain continuity and concavity of the multi-objective game's payoff function,we proof the bargaining equilibrium still exists and is also a weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium.Moreover,we analyze several special bargaining equilibria,and compare them in a few examples.展开更多
Industrial relocation and ecological subsidy are viewed as effective ways to overcome transboundary industrial pollution. In this paper, we study the transboundary industrial pollution control problem in the Beijing-T...Industrial relocation and ecological subsidy are viewed as effective ways to overcome transboundary industrial pollution. In this paper, we study the transboundary industrial pollution control problem in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region in the context of industrial relocation. Firstly, we construct an economic model of pollution control with relevant variables such as environmental tax and environmental damage coefficient. Secondly, we solve the economic contributions by using the proportional split-off solution. Finally, we compare the optimal relocation quantity and welfare functions in both cooperative and non-cooperative cases. Our research finds that: 1) The optimal strategy is closely related to utility coefficient, environmental loss coefficient and incentive intensity coefficient.2) The welfare function and the optimal relocation quantity in the cooperative case are significantly greater than those in the non-cooperative case. Based on the analysis, some suggestions are provided for transboundary industrial pollution management.展开更多
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China: Welfare Measuring and Balancing of Different Interest Groups during Rural-urban Land Conversion (Grant No. 70773047)Special Fund of Doctoral Disciplines in Ministry of Education of China: Research on Value Choice and Exterior Factors of Rural-urban Land Conversion (Grant No. 20070504020)
文摘Rural-urban land conversion is currently a common social economic phenomenon during the process of economic development and rural urbanization in China. Rural-urban land conversion is positively effective as far as social and economic benefits are concerned (Yang, 2002), but its negative effect is also evident, resulting in such problems as low efficiency of rural land configuration and loss of social welfare. Consequently, farm-ers should also have an equal chance to enjoy the social welfare enhanced by land conversion. Based on the theories of welfare economy, this paper puts forward policy suggestions by discussing the welfare changes of various interest groups, builds the model of welfare distribution, and analyzes the conditions of maximizing social welfare. The absolute and opposite value of social welfare is closely related with the speed of rural-urban land conversion, and governments should give farmers and collectives fair compensa-tion to make up for the utility loss caused by land expropriation, which are conclusions drawn from this paper. This study aims to provide a theoretical basis for regulating targets and evaluation criteria, realizing the mechanism and implementation of public po-lices during rural-urban land conversion.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.11271098)by the Science and Technology Fund Program of Guizhou Province(No.7425)。
文摘To solve the choice of multi-objective game's equilibria,we construct general bargaining games called self-bargaining games,and define their individual welfare functions with three appropriate axioms.According to the individual welfare functions,we transform the multi–objective game into a single-objective game and define its bargaining equilibrium,which is a Nash equilibrium of the single-objective game.And then,based on certain continuity and concavity of the multi-objective game's payoff function,we proof the bargaining equilibrium still exists and is also a weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium.Moreover,we analyze several special bargaining equilibria,and compare them in a few examples.
基金Supported by Foreign Expert’s Program of Ministry of Science and Technology of China (G2022106001L).
文摘Industrial relocation and ecological subsidy are viewed as effective ways to overcome transboundary industrial pollution. In this paper, we study the transboundary industrial pollution control problem in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region in the context of industrial relocation. Firstly, we construct an economic model of pollution control with relevant variables such as environmental tax and environmental damage coefficient. Secondly, we solve the economic contributions by using the proportional split-off solution. Finally, we compare the optimal relocation quantity and welfare functions in both cooperative and non-cooperative cases. Our research finds that: 1) The optimal strategy is closely related to utility coefficient, environmental loss coefficient and incentive intensity coefficient.2) The welfare function and the optimal relocation quantity in the cooperative case are significantly greater than those in the non-cooperative case. Based on the analysis, some suggestions are provided for transboundary industrial pollution management.
