A new method is introduced in this paper. This method can be used to study the stability of controlled holonomic Hamilton systems under disturbance of Gaussian white noise. At first, the motion equation of controlled ...A new method is introduced in this paper. This method can be used to study the stability of controlled holonomic Hamilton systems under disturbance of Gaussian white noise. At first, the motion equation of controlled holonomic Hamilton systems excited by Gaussian noise is formulated. A theory to stabilize the system is provided. Finally, one example is given to illustrate the application procedures.展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
基金Sponsored by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (1057202110472040)Fundamental Research Foundation of Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT-UBF-200507A4206)
文摘A new method is introduced in this paper. This method can be used to study the stability of controlled holonomic Hamilton systems under disturbance of Gaussian white noise. At first, the motion equation of controlled holonomic Hamilton systems excited by Gaussian noise is formulated. A theory to stabilize the system is provided. Finally, one example is given to illustrate the application procedures.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
