The use of symbol attributes on the side of symbolic social networks to analyze,understand,and predict the topology,function,and dynamic behaviour of complex networks,and has important theoretical significance for per...The use of symbol attributes on the side of symbolic social networks to analyze,understand,and predict the topology,function,and dynamic behaviour of complex networks,and has important theoretical significance for personalized recommendations,attitude prediction,user feature analysis,and clustering and application value.However,due to the huge scale of online social networks,this poses a challenge to traditional symbolic social network analysis methods.Based on the theory of structural equilibrium,this paper studies the evolutionary dynamics of symbolic social networks,proposes the energy function of weak structural equilibrium theory,and uses the evolution of evolutionary algorithms to obtain the weak imbalance of the network.The simulation experiment results show that the calculation method in this paper can get the optimal solution faster.It provides an idea for the study of real and complex social networks.展开更多
This paper reports a new simple four-dimensional（4 D） hyperjerk chaotic system. The proposed system has only one stable equilibrium point. Hence, its strange attractor belongs to the category of hidden attractors. T...This paper reports a new simple four-dimensional（4 D） hyperjerk chaotic system. The proposed system has only one stable equilibrium point. Hence, its strange attractor belongs to the category of hidden attractors. The proposed system exhibits various dynamical behaviors including chaotic, periodic, stable nature, and coexistence of various attractors. Numerous theoretical and numerical methods are used for the analyses of this system. The chaotic behavior of the new system is validated using circuit implementation. Further, the synchronization of the proposed systems is shown by designing an adaptive integrator backstepping controller. Numerical simulation validates the synchronization strategy.展开更多
The present theoretical study represents a proposal aimed at investigating about the possibility of generalizing the canonical entropy-exergy relationship and the reservoir concept. The method adopted assumes the equa...The present theoretical study represents a proposal aimed at investigating about the possibility of generalizing the canonical entropy-exergy relationship and the reservoir concept. The method adopted assumes the equality of pressure and chemical potential as necessary conditions of mutual stable equilibrium between a system and a reservoir in addition to the equality of temperature that constitutes the basis for defining entropy as deriving from energy and exergy concepts. An attempt is made to define mechanical and chemical entropy as an additional and additive component of generalized entropy formulated from generalized exergy property. The implications in exergy method and the possible engineering applications of this approach are outlined as future developments among the domains involved.展开更多
The literature reports that equality of temperature, equality of potential and equality of pressure between a system and a reservoir are necessary conditions for the stable equilibrium of the system-reservoir composit...The literature reports that equality of temperature, equality of potential and equality of pressure between a system and a reservoir are necessary conditions for the stable equilibrium of the system-reservoir composite or, in the opposite and equivalent logical inference, that stable equilibrium is a sufficient condition for equality. The aim and the first novelty of the present study is to prove that equality of temperature, potential and pressure is also a sufficient condition for stable equilibrium, in addition to necessity, implying that stable equilibrium is a condition also necessary, in addition to sufficiency, for equality. The second novelty is that the proof of the sufficiency of equality (or the necessity of stable equilibrium) is attained by means of the generalization of the entropy property, derived from the generalization of exergy property, which is used to demonstrate that stable equilibrium is a logical consequence of equality of generalized potential. This proof is underpinned by the Second Law statement and the Maximum-Entropy Principle based on generalized entropy which depends on temperature, potential and pressure of the reservoir. The conclusion, based on these two novel concepts, consists of the theorem of necessity and sufficiency of stable equilibrium for equality of generalized potentials within a composite constituted by a system and a reservoir.展开更多
Among all statements of Second Law, the existence and uniqueness of stable equilibrium, for each given value of energy content and composition of constituents of any system, have been adopted to define thermodynamic e...Among all statements of Second Law, the existence and uniqueness of stable equilibrium, for each given value of energy content and composition of constituents of any system, have been adopted to define thermodynamic entropy by means of the impossibility of Perpetual Motion Machine of the Second Kind (PMM2) which is a consequence of the Second Law. Equality of temperature, chemical potential and pressure in many-particle systems are proved to be necessary conditions for the stable equilibrium. The proofs assume the stable equilibrium and derive, by means of the Highest-Entropy Principle, equality of temperature, chemical potential and pressure as a consequence. A first novelty of the present research is to demonstrate that equality is also a sufficient condition, in addition to necessity, for stable equilibrium implying that stable equilibrium is a condition also necessary, in addition to sufficiency, for equality of temperature potential and pressure addressed to as generalized potential. The second novelty is that the proof of sufficiency of equality, or necessity of stable equilibrium, is achieved by means of a generalization of entropy property, derived from a generalized definition of exergy, both being state and additive properties accounting for heat, mass and work interactions of the system underpinning the definition of Highest-Generalized-Entropy Principle adopted in the proof.展开更多
Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic kno...Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.展开更多
By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumu...By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when s is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the ＇Hawk-Dove＇ game and the ＇Coordinate＇ game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.展开更多
Using the semi-tensor product method, this paper investigates the modeling and analysis of networked evolutionary games(NEGs) with finite memories, and presents a number of new results. Firstly, a kind of algebraic ex...Using the semi-tensor product method, this paper investigates the modeling and analysis of networked evolutionary games(NEGs) with finite memories, and presents a number of new results. Firstly, a kind of algebraic expression is formulated for the networked evolutionary games with finite memories, based on which the behavior of the corresponding evolutionary game is analyzed. Secondly, under a proper assumption, the existence of Nash equilibrium of the given networked evolutionary games is proved and a free-type strategy sequence is designed for the convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, an illustrative example is worked out to support the obtained new results.展开更多
This paper considers the modeling and convergence of hyper-networked evolutionary games （HNEGs）. In an HNEG the network graph is a hypergraph, which allows the fundamental network game to be a multi-player one. Usin...This paper considers the modeling and convergence of hyper-networked evolutionary games （HNEGs）. In an HNEG the network graph is a hypergraph, which allows the fundamental network game to be a multi-player one. Using semi-tensor product of matrices and the fundamental evolutionary equation, the dynamics of an HNEG is obtained and we extend the results about the networked evolutionary games to show whether an HNEG is potential and how to calculate the potential. Then we propose a new strategy updating rule, called the cascading myopic best response adjustment rule （MBRAR）, and prove that under the cascading MBRAR the strategies of an HNEG will converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. An example is presented and discussed in detail to demonstrate the theoretical and numerical results.展开更多
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to de...Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.展开更多
We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished...We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.展开更多
Networked noncooperative games are investigated,where each player(or agent) plays with all other players in its neighborhood. Assume the evolution is based on the fact that each player uses its neighbors current infor...Networked noncooperative games are investigated,where each player(or agent) plays with all other players in its neighborhood. Assume the evolution is based on the fact that each player uses its neighbors current information to decide its next strategy. By using sub-neighborhood, the dynamics of the evolution is obtained. Then a method for calculating Nash equilibriums from mixed strategies of multi-players is proposed.The relationship between local Nash equilibriums based on individual neighborhoods and global Nash equilibriums of overall network is revealed. Then a technique is proposed to construct Nash equilibriums of an evolutionary game from its one step static Nash equilibriums. The basic tool of this approach is the semi-tensor product of matrices, which converts strategies into logical matrices and payoffs into pseudo-Boolean functions, then networked evolutionary games become discrete time dynamic systems.展开更多
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(61772196,61472136)Hunan Provincial Focus Natural Science Fund(2020JJ4249)+4 种基金Key Project of Hunan Provincial Social Science Achievement Review Committee(XSP 19ZD1005)Postgraduate Scientific Research Innovation Project of Hunan Province(CX20201074)Hunan Technology and Business University’s 2019 school-level degree and postgraduate education and teaching reform project(YJG2019YB13)The 2020 school-level teaching reform project of Hunan Technology and Business University(School Teaching Word[2020]No.15)Research Project of Degree and Postgraduate Education Reform in Hunan Province(2020JGYB234).
文摘The use of symbol attributes on the side of symbolic social networks to analyze,understand,and predict the topology,function,and dynamic behaviour of complex networks,and has important theoretical significance for personalized recommendations,attitude prediction,user feature analysis,and clustering and application value.However,due to the huge scale of online social networks,this poses a challenge to traditional symbolic social network analysis methods.Based on the theory of structural equilibrium,this paper studies the evolutionary dynamics of symbolic social networks,proposes the energy function of weak structural equilibrium theory,and uses the evolution of evolutionary algorithms to obtain the weak imbalance of the network.The simulation experiment results show that the calculation method in this paper can get the optimal solution faster.It provides an idea for the study of real and complex social networks.
文摘This paper reports a new simple four-dimensional（4 D） hyperjerk chaotic system. The proposed system has only one stable equilibrium point. Hence, its strange attractor belongs to the category of hidden attractors. The proposed system exhibits various dynamical behaviors including chaotic, periodic, stable nature, and coexistence of various attractors. Numerous theoretical and numerical methods are used for the analyses of this system. The chaotic behavior of the new system is validated using circuit implementation. Further, the synchronization of the proposed systems is shown by designing an adaptive integrator backstepping controller. Numerical simulation validates the synchronization strategy.
文摘The present theoretical study represents a proposal aimed at investigating about the possibility of generalizing the canonical entropy-exergy relationship and the reservoir concept. The method adopted assumes the equality of pressure and chemical potential as necessary conditions of mutual stable equilibrium between a system and a reservoir in addition to the equality of temperature that constitutes the basis for defining entropy as deriving from energy and exergy concepts. An attempt is made to define mechanical and chemical entropy as an additional and additive component of generalized entropy formulated from generalized exergy property. The implications in exergy method and the possible engineering applications of this approach are outlined as future developments among the domains involved.
文摘The literature reports that equality of temperature, equality of potential and equality of pressure between a system and a reservoir are necessary conditions for the stable equilibrium of the system-reservoir composite or, in the opposite and equivalent logical inference, that stable equilibrium is a sufficient condition for equality. The aim and the first novelty of the present study is to prove that equality of temperature, potential and pressure is also a sufficient condition for stable equilibrium, in addition to necessity, implying that stable equilibrium is a condition also necessary, in addition to sufficiency, for equality. The second novelty is that the proof of the sufficiency of equality (or the necessity of stable equilibrium) is attained by means of the generalization of the entropy property, derived from the generalization of exergy property, which is used to demonstrate that stable equilibrium is a logical consequence of equality of generalized potential. This proof is underpinned by the Second Law statement and the Maximum-Entropy Principle based on generalized entropy which depends on temperature, potential and pressure of the reservoir. The conclusion, based on these two novel concepts, consists of the theorem of necessity and sufficiency of stable equilibrium for equality of generalized potentials within a composite constituted by a system and a reservoir.
文摘Among all statements of Second Law, the existence and uniqueness of stable equilibrium, for each given value of energy content and composition of constituents of any system, have been adopted to define thermodynamic entropy by means of the impossibility of Perpetual Motion Machine of the Second Kind (PMM2) which is a consequence of the Second Law. Equality of temperature, chemical potential and pressure in many-particle systems are proved to be necessary conditions for the stable equilibrium. The proofs assume the stable equilibrium and derive, by means of the Highest-Entropy Principle, equality of temperature, chemical potential and pressure as a consequence. A first novelty of the present research is to demonstrate that equality is also a sufficient condition, in addition to necessity, for stable equilibrium implying that stable equilibrium is a condition also necessary, in addition to sufficiency, for equality of temperature potential and pressure addressed to as generalized potential. The second novelty is that the proof of sufficiency of equality, or necessity of stable equilibrium, is achieved by means of a generalization of entropy property, derived from a generalized definition of exergy, both being state and additive properties accounting for heat, mass and work interactions of the system underpinning the definition of Highest-Generalized-Entropy Principle adopted in the proof.
文摘Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71071119)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
文摘By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when s is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the ＇Hawk-Dove＇ game and the ＇Coordinate＇ game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(61503225)the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province(ZR2015FQ003,ZR201709260273)
文摘Using the semi-tensor product method, this paper investigates the modeling and analysis of networked evolutionary games(NEGs) with finite memories, and presents a number of new results. Firstly, a kind of algebraic expression is formulated for the networked evolutionary games with finite memories, based on which the behavior of the corresponding evolutionary game is analyzed. Secondly, under a proper assumption, the existence of Nash equilibrium of the given networked evolutionary games is proved and a free-type strategy sequence is designed for the convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, an illustrative example is worked out to support the obtained new results.
基金supported partly by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.61074114 and 61273013)
文摘This paper considers the modeling and convergence of hyper-networked evolutionary games （HNEGs）. In an HNEG the network graph is a hypergraph, which allows the fundamental network game to be a multi-player one. Using semi-tensor product of matrices and the fundamental evolutionary equation, the dynamics of an HNEG is obtained and we extend the results about the networked evolutionary games to show whether an HNEG is potential and how to calculate the potential. Then we propose a new strategy updating rule, called the cascading myopic best response adjustment rule （MBRAR）, and prove that under the cascading MBRAR the strategies of an HNEG will converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. An example is presented and discussed in detail to demonstrate the theoretical and numerical results.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71071119 and 60574071
文摘Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71501149 and 71231007)the Soft Science Project of Hubei Province,China(Grant No.2017ADC122)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,China(Grant No.WUT:2017VI070)
文摘We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.
文摘Networked noncooperative games are investigated,where each player(or agent) plays with all other players in its neighborhood. Assume the evolution is based on the fact that each player uses its neighbors current information to decide its next strategy. By using sub-neighborhood, the dynamics of the evolution is obtained. Then a method for calculating Nash equilibriums from mixed strategies of multi-players is proposed.The relationship between local Nash equilibriums based on individual neighborhoods and global Nash equilibriums of overall network is revealed. Then a technique is proposed to construct Nash equilibriums of an evolutionary game from its one step static Nash equilibriums. The basic tool of this approach is the semi-tensor product of matrices, which converts strategies into logical matrices and payoffs into pseudo-Boolean functions, then networked evolutionary games become discrete time dynamic systems.
