This paper develops a sequential fair Stackelberg auction model in which each of the two risk-seeking insiders has an equal chance to be a leader or follower at each auction stage. The authors establish the existence,...This paper develops a sequential fair Stackelberg auction model in which each of the two risk-seeking insiders has an equal chance to be a leader or follower at each auction stage. The authors establish the existence, uniqueness of sequential fair Stackelberg equilibria （in short, FSE） when both insiders adopt linear strategies, and find that at the sequential equilibria such two insiders compete aggressively that cause the liquidity of market to drop, the information to be revealed and the profit to go down very rapidly while the trading intensity goes substantially high. Furthermore, the authors also give continuous versions of corresponding parameters in the sequential FSE in closed forms, as the time interval between auctions approaches to zero. It shows that such parameters go down or up approximately exponentially and all of the liquidity of market, information and profit become zero while the trading intensity goes to infinity. Some numerical simulations about the sequential FSE are also illustrated.展开更多
In this paper, a class of stochastic differential equations (SDEs) driven by semi-martingale with non-Lipschitz coefficients is studied. We investigate the dependence of solutions to SDEs on the initial value. To obta...In this paper, a class of stochastic differential equations (SDEs) driven by semi-martingale with non-Lipschitz coefficients is studied. We investigate the dependence of solutions to SDEs on the initial value. To obtain a continuous version, we impose the conditions on the local characteristic of semimartingale. In this case, it gives rise to a flow of homeomorphisms if the local characteristic is compactly supported.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.10721101China’s National 973 Project(2006CB805900)+1 种基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.11161011 and 11365005Guizhou EDKY[2016]027,Guizhou QKZYD[2016]4006,Guizhou ZDXK[2016]8
文摘This paper develops a sequential fair Stackelberg auction model in which each of the two risk-seeking insiders has an equal chance to be a leader or follower at each auction stage. The authors establish the existence, uniqueness of sequential fair Stackelberg equilibria （in short, FSE） when both insiders adopt linear strategies, and find that at the sequential equilibria such two insiders compete aggressively that cause the liquidity of market to drop, the information to be revealed and the profit to go down very rapidly while the trading intensity goes substantially high. Furthermore, the authors also give continuous versions of corresponding parameters in the sequential FSE in closed forms, as the time interval between auctions approaches to zero. It shows that such parameters go down or up approximately exponentially and all of the liquidity of market, information and profit become zero while the trading intensity goes to infinity. Some numerical simulations about the sequential FSE are also illustrated.
基金Project supported by National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program,No.2007CB814901)National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.10826098)+1 种基金Anhui Natural Science Foundation (No.090416225)Anhui Natural Science Foundation of Universities
文摘In this paper, a class of stochastic differential equations (SDEs) driven by semi-martingale with non-Lipschitz coefficients is studied. We investigate the dependence of solutions to SDEs on the initial value. To obtain a continuous version, we impose the conditions on the local characteristic of semimartingale. In this case, it gives rise to a flow of homeomorphisms if the local characteristic is compactly supported.
