Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic kno...Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.展开更多
By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumu...By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when s is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the ＇Hawk-Dove＇ game and the ＇Coordinate＇ game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.展开更多
The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds ma...The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit.展开更多
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to de...Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.展开更多
Local mate competition(LMC) was firstly used to explain extra-ordinary female-biased sex ratios. However, some observations have found that the sex ratios of some species are more female-biased than the predictions of...Local mate competition(LMC) was firstly used to explain extra-ordinary female-biased sex ratios. However, some observations have found that the sex ratios of some species are more female-biased than the predictions of LMC and its extensions; there is not yet a theory that accounts for the mechanisms of more female-biased sex ratio. Here, we assume that LMC occurs at a destructed habitat that reduces the resource for production, and present a new extension for the LMC model. Consequently, our model shows that the evolutionarily stable strategy(ESS) for sex ratio depends on two parameters: the number of foundresses and the degree of habitat destruction. Moreover, the sex ratio decreases as the degree of habitat destruction increases, i.e., the proportion of female increases. These results generally agree with experimental data, and may provide a new basis for the evolution of female-biased sex ratios in local mate competition and a new theory support for conservation of some species.展开更多
Enabling data sharing among smart grid power suppliers is a pressing challenge due to technical hurdles in verifying,storing,and synchronizing energy metering data.Access and sharing limitations are stringent for user...Enabling data sharing among smart grid power suppliers is a pressing challenge due to technical hurdles in verifying,storing,and synchronizing energy metering data.Access and sharing limitations are stringent for users,power companies,and researchers,demanding significant resources and time for permissions and verification.This paper proposes a blockchain-based architecture for secure and efficient sharing of electric energy metering data.Further,we propose a data sharing model based on evolutionary game theory.Based on the Lyapunov stability theory,the model’s evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)is analyzed.Numerical results verify the correctness and practicability of the scheme proposed in this paper,and provide a new method for realizing convenient,safe and fast data sharing.展开更多
Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this ...Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this travel method,despite its numerous benefits.Here,this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game theory(EGT)model to verify the evolutionary stability of choosing the PUDO strategy of drivers and passengers and offering subsidies strategy of carpooling platforms in carpooling system.The model presented in this paper serves as a valuable tool for assessing the dissemination and implementation of PUDO strategy and offering subsidies strategy in carpooling applications.Subsequently,an empirical analysis is conducted to examine and compare the sensitivity of the parameters across various scenarios.The findings suggest that:firstly,providing subsidies to passengers and drivers,along with deductions for drivers through carpooling platforms,is an effective way to promote wider adoption of the PUDO strategy.Then,the decision-making process is divided into three stages:initial stage,middle stage,and mature stage.PUDO strategy progresses from initial rejection to widespread acceptance among drivers in the middle stage and,in the mature stage,both passengers and drivers tend to adopt it under carpooling platform subsidies;the factors influencing the costs of waiting and walking times,as well as the subsidies granted to passengers,are essential determinants that require careful consideration by passengers,drivers,and carpooling platforms when choosing the PUDO strategy.Our work provides valuable insight into the PUDO strategy’s applicability and the declared results provide implications for traffic managers and carpooling platforms to offer a suitable incentive.展开更多
The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dyn...The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the shortterm interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always disturbed because the change of the environment, firm’s structure, and so forth. Using the replicator dynamics,the evolutionary stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers in the long-term interaction are analyzed. Finally, the extend case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers include three pure strategies is investigated. These results are found that the strategy profile in which both manufacturer and retailer choose fairness or altruism, or one player chooses fair or altruistic strategy and the other player chooses selfish strategy may be evolutionary stable, the stability of these equilibria depends on the the preference parameters.展开更多
The present paper investigates the problem of incentive compatibility of voting mechanism and shows that the mechanism of approval voting is incentive-compatible,i.e. its mechanism gives voters incentive for voting si...The present paper investigates the problem of incentive compatibility of voting mechanism and shows that the mechanism of approval voting is incentive-compatible,i.e. its mechanism gives voters incentive for voting sincerely.展开更多
In this paper, with the method of adaptive dynamics, we investigate the coevolution of phenotypic traits of predator and prey species. The evolutionary model is constructed from a deterministic approximation of the un...In this paper, with the method of adaptive dynamics, we investigate the coevolution of phenotypic traits of predator and prey species. The evolutionary model is constructed from a deterministic approximation of the underlying stochastic ecological processes. Firstly, we investigate the ecological and evolutionary conditions that allow for continu- ously stable strategy and evolutionary branching. We find that evolutionary branching in the prey phenotype will occur when the frequency dependence in the prey carrying capacity is not strong. Furthermore, it is found that if the two prey branches move far away enough, the evolutionary branching in the prey phenotype will induce the sec- ondary branching in the predator phenotype. The final evolutionary outcome contains two prey and two predator species. Secondly, we show that under symmetric interactions the evolutionary model admits a supercritical Hopf bifurcation if the frequency depen- dence in the prey carrying capa.city is very weak. Evolutionary cycle is a likely outcome of the nmtation-selection processes. Finally, we find that frequency-dependent selection can drive the predator population to extinction under asymmetric interactions.展开更多
Bitcoin is the most famous and the most used cryptocurrency in the world,such that it has received extreme popularity in recent years.However the Bitcoin system is accompanied by different attacks,including the block ...Bitcoin is the most famous and the most used cryptocurrency in the world,such that it has received extreme popularity in recent years.However the Bitcoin system is accompanied by different attacks,including the block withholding(BWH)attack.When a miner plays the BWH attack,it will withhold all the blocks newly discovered in the attack pool,damaging the honest miners’right to obtain the fair reward.In this paper,we consider a setting in which two miners may honestly mine or perform the BWH attack in a mining pool.Different strategy profiles will bring different payoffs,in addition influence the selection of the strategies.Therefore,we establish an evolutionary game model to study the behavior tendency of the miners and the evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions,by formulating the replicator dynamic equations.Through numerical simulations,we further verify the theoretical results on evolutionary stable solutions and discuss the impact of the factors on miners’strategic choice.Based on these simulation results,we also make some recommendations for the manager and the miners to mitigate the BWH attack and to promote the cooperation between miners in a mining pool.展开更多
文摘Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71071119)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
文摘By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when s is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the ＇Hawk-Dove＇ game and the ＇Coordinate＇ game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61672408, U1405255, 61502368, 61602537, 61602357, 61672413, U1509214, U1135002)National High Technology Research and Development Program (863 Program) (Grant Nos. 2015AA016007, 2015AA017203)+5 种基金China Postdoctoral Science Foundation Funded Project (Grant No.2016M592762)Shaanxi Science & Technology Coordination & Innovation Project (Grant No.2016TZC-G-6-3)Shaanxi Provincial Natural Science Foundation (Grant Nos. 2015JQ6227, 2016JM6005)China 111 Project (Grant No. B16037)Beijing Municipal Social Science Foundation(Grant No. 16XCC023)Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant Nos. JB150308, JB150309, JB161501, JBG161511)
文摘The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71071119 and 60574071
文摘Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
基金Funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.31600299)the Young Talent Fund of University Association for Science and Technology in Shaanxi Province,China(No.20160234)+1 种基金the Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Provincial Department of Education(No.17JK0040)the Key Project of Baoji University of Arts and Sciences(No.ZK16050)
文摘Local mate competition(LMC) was firstly used to explain extra-ordinary female-biased sex ratios. However, some observations have found that the sex ratios of some species are more female-biased than the predictions of LMC and its extensions; there is not yet a theory that accounts for the mechanisms of more female-biased sex ratio. Here, we assume that LMC occurs at a destructed habitat that reduces the resource for production, and present a new extension for the LMC model. Consequently, our model shows that the evolutionarily stable strategy(ESS) for sex ratio depends on two parameters: the number of foundresses and the degree of habitat destruction. Moreover, the sex ratio decreases as the degree of habitat destruction increases, i.e., the proportion of female increases. These results generally agree with experimental data, and may provide a new basis for the evolution of female-biased sex ratios in local mate competition and a new theory support for conservation of some species.
文摘Enabling data sharing among smart grid power suppliers is a pressing challenge due to technical hurdles in verifying,storing,and synchronizing energy metering data.Access and sharing limitations are stringent for users,power companies,and researchers,demanding significant resources and time for permissions and verification.This paper proposes a blockchain-based architecture for secure and efficient sharing of electric energy metering data.Further,we propose a data sharing model based on evolutionary game theory.Based on the Lyapunov stability theory,the model’s evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)is analyzed.Numerical results verify the correctness and practicability of the scheme proposed in this paper,and provide a new method for realizing convenient,safe and fast data sharing.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72171172 and 62088101the Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology,China Major Project under Grant No.2021SHZDZX0100the Shanghai Municipal Commission of Science and Technology,China Project under Grant No.19511132101.
文摘Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this travel method,despite its numerous benefits.Here,this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game theory(EGT)model to verify the evolutionary stability of choosing the PUDO strategy of drivers and passengers and offering subsidies strategy of carpooling platforms in carpooling system.The model presented in this paper serves as a valuable tool for assessing the dissemination and implementation of PUDO strategy and offering subsidies strategy in carpooling applications.Subsequently,an empirical analysis is conducted to examine and compare the sensitivity of the parameters across various scenarios.The findings suggest that:firstly,providing subsidies to passengers and drivers,along with deductions for drivers through carpooling platforms,is an effective way to promote wider adoption of the PUDO strategy.Then,the decision-making process is divided into three stages:initial stage,middle stage,and mature stage.PUDO strategy progresses from initial rejection to widespread acceptance among drivers in the middle stage and,in the mature stage,both passengers and drivers tend to adopt it under carpooling platform subsidies;the factors influencing the costs of waiting and walking times,as well as the subsidies granted to passengers,are essential determinants that require careful consideration by passengers,drivers,and carpooling platforms when choosing the PUDO strategy.Our work provides valuable insight into the PUDO strategy’s applicability and the declared results provide implications for traffic managers and carpooling platforms to offer a suitable incentive.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71371093)the Natural Science Foundation of the Higher Education Institutions of Jiangsu Province(17KJB120006)
文摘The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the shortterm interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always disturbed because the change of the environment, firm’s structure, and so forth. Using the replicator dynamics,the evolutionary stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers in the long-term interaction are analyzed. Finally, the extend case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers include three pure strategies is investigated. These results are found that the strategy profile in which both manufacturer and retailer choose fairness or altruism, or one player chooses fair or altruistic strategy and the other player chooses selfish strategy may be evolutionary stable, the stability of these equilibria depends on the the preference parameters.
文摘The present paper investigates the problem of incentive compatibility of voting mechanism and shows that the mechanism of approval voting is incentive-compatible,i.e. its mechanism gives voters incentive for voting sincerely.
文摘In this paper, with the method of adaptive dynamics, we investigate the coevolution of phenotypic traits of predator and prey species. The evolutionary model is constructed from a deterministic approximation of the underlying stochastic ecological processes. Firstly, we investigate the ecological and evolutionary conditions that allow for continu- ously stable strategy and evolutionary branching. We find that evolutionary branching in the prey phenotype will occur when the frequency dependence in the prey carrying capacity is not strong. Furthermore, it is found that if the two prey branches move far away enough, the evolutionary branching in the prey phenotype will induce the sec- ondary branching in the predator phenotype. The final evolutionary outcome contains two prey and two predator species. Secondly, we show that under symmetric interactions the evolutionary model admits a supercritical Hopf bifurcation if the frequency depen- dence in the prey carrying capa.city is very weak. Evolutionary cycle is a likely outcome of the nmtation-selection processes. Finally, we find that frequency-dependent selection can drive the predator population to extinction under asymmetric interactions.
基金the National Nature Science Foundation of China(11871366)Qing Lan Project for Young Academic Leaders+1 种基金Qing Lan Project for Key Teachersthe Research Innovation Program for College Graduate Students of Jiangsu Province(KYCX20-2790)。
文摘Bitcoin is the most famous and the most used cryptocurrency in the world,such that it has received extreme popularity in recent years.However the Bitcoin system is accompanied by different attacks,including the block withholding(BWH)attack.When a miner plays the BWH attack,it will withhold all the blocks newly discovered in the attack pool,damaging the honest miners’right to obtain the fair reward.In this paper,we consider a setting in which two miners may honestly mine or perform the BWH attack in a mining pool.Different strategy profiles will bring different payoffs,in addition influence the selection of the strategies.Therefore,we establish an evolutionary game model to study the behavior tendency of the miners and the evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions,by formulating the replicator dynamic equations.Through numerical simulations,we further verify the theoretical results on evolutionary stable solutions and discuss the impact of the factors on miners’strategic choice.Based on these simulation results,we also make some recommendations for the manager and the miners to mitigate the BWH attack and to promote the cooperation between miners in a mining pool.
