In this paper,the convergence of the split-step theta method for stochastic differential equations is analyzed using stochastic C-stability and stochastic B-consistency.The fact that the numerical scheme,which is both...In this paper,the convergence of the split-step theta method for stochastic differential equations is analyzed using stochastic C-stability and stochastic B-consistency.The fact that the numerical scheme,which is both stochastically C-stable and stochastically B-consistent,is convergent has been proved in a previous paper.In order to analyze the convergence of the split-step theta method(θ∈[1/2,1]),the stochastic C-stability and stochastic B-consistency under the condition of global monotonicity have been researched,and the rate of convergence 1/2 has been explored in this paper.It can be seen that the convergence does not require the drift function should satisfy the linear growth condition whenθ=1/2 Furthermore,the rate of the convergence of the split-step scheme for stochastic differential equations with additive noise has been researched and found to be 1.Finally,an example is given to illustrate the convergence with the theoretical results.展开更多
In this paper, we introduce a simple coalition formation game in the environment of bidding, which is a special case of the weighted majority game （WMG）, and is named the weighted simple-majority game （WSMG）. In W...In this paper, we introduce a simple coalition formation game in the environment of bidding, which is a special case of the weighted majority game （WMG）, and is named the weighted simple-majority game （WSMG）. In WSMG, payoff is allocated to the winners proportional to the players powers, which can be measured in various ways. We define a new kind of stability： the counteraction-stability （C-stability）, where any potential deviating players will confront counteractions of the other players. We show that C-stable coalition structures in WSMG always contains a minimal winning coalition of minimum total power. For the variant where powers are measured directly by their weights, we show that it is NP-hard to find a C-stable coalition structure and design a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm. Sensitivity analysis for this variant, which shows many interesting properties, is also done. We also prove that it is NP-hard to compute the Holler-Packel indices in WSMGs, and hence in WMGs as well.展开更多
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 12301521)the Natural Science Foundation of Shanxi Province (Grant No. 20210302124081)。
文摘In this paper,the convergence of the split-step theta method for stochastic differential equations is analyzed using stochastic C-stability and stochastic B-consistency.The fact that the numerical scheme,which is both stochastically C-stable and stochastically B-consistent,is convergent has been proved in a previous paper.In order to analyze the convergence of the split-step theta method(θ∈[1/2,1]),the stochastic C-stability and stochastic B-consistency under the condition of global monotonicity have been researched,and the rate of convergence 1/2 has been explored in this paper.It can be seen that the convergence does not require the drift function should satisfy the linear growth condition whenθ=1/2 Furthermore,the rate of the convergence of the split-step scheme for stochastic differential equations with additive noise has been researched and found to be 1.Finally,an example is given to illustrate the convergence with the theoretical results.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundationof China(No. 70425004)
文摘In this paper, we introduce a simple coalition formation game in the environment of bidding, which is a special case of the weighted majority game （WMG）, and is named the weighted simple-majority game （WSMG）. In WSMG, payoff is allocated to the winners proportional to the players powers, which can be measured in various ways. We define a new kind of stability： the counteraction-stability （C-stability）, where any potential deviating players will confront counteractions of the other players. We show that C-stable coalition structures in WSMG always contains a minimal winning coalition of minimum total power. For the variant where powers are measured directly by their weights, we show that it is NP-hard to find a C-stable coalition structure and design a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm. Sensitivity analysis for this variant, which shows many interesting properties, is also done. We also prove that it is NP-hard to compute the Holler-Packel indices in WSMGs, and hence in WMGs as well.
