Cognitive bias,stemming from electronic measurement error and variability in human perception,exists in cognitive electronic warfare and affects the outcomes of conflicts.In this paper,the dynamic game approach is emp...Cognitive bias,stemming from electronic measurement error and variability in human perception,exists in cognitive electronic warfare and affects the outcomes of conflicts.In this paper,the dynamic game approach is employed to develop a model for cognitive bias induced by incomplete information and measurement errors in cognitive radar countermeasures.The payoffs for both parties are calculated using the radar's anti-jamming strategy matrix A and the jammer's jamming strategy matrix B.With perfect Bayesian equilibrium,a dynamic radar countermeasure model is established,and the impact of cognitive bias is analyzed.Drawing inspiration from the cognitive bias analysis method used in stock market trading,a cognitive bias model for cognitive radar countermeasures is introduced,and its correctness is mathematically proved.A gaming scenario involving the AN/SPY-1 radar and a smart jammer is set up to analyze the influence of cognitive bias on game outcomes.Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.展开更多
The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-...The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.展开更多
A game measurement model considering the attacker’s knowledge background is proposed based on the Bayesian game theory aiming at striking a balance between the protection of sensitive information and the quality of s...A game measurement model considering the attacker’s knowledge background is proposed based on the Bayesian game theory aiming at striking a balance between the protection of sensitive information and the quality of service.We quantified the sensitive level of information according to the user’s personalized sensitive information protection needs.Based on the probability distribution of sensitive level and attacker’s knowledge background type,the strategy combination of service provider and attacker was analyzed,and a game-based sensitive information protection model was constructed.Through the combination of strategies under Bayesian equilibrium,the information entropy was used to measure the leakage of sensitive information.Furthermore,in the paper the influence of the sensitive level of information and the attacker’s knowledge background on the strategy of both sides of the game was considered comprehensively.Further on,the leakage of the user’s sensitive information was measured.Finally,the feasibility of the model was described by experiments.展开更多
Wireless ad ho network is becoming a new research fronter, in which security is an important issue. Usually some nodes act maliciously and they are able to do different kinds of Denial of Service (Dos). Because of the...Wireless ad ho network is becoming a new research fronter, in which security is an important issue. Usually some nodes act maliciously and they are able to do different kinds of Denial of Service (Dos). Because of the limited resource, intrusion detection system (IDS) runs all the time to detect intrusion of the attacker which is a costly overhead. In our model, we use game theory to model the interactions between the intrusion detection system and the attacker, and a realistic model is given by using Bayesian game. We solve the game by finding the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The results of our analysis show that the IDS could work intermittently without compromising on its effectiveness. At the end of this paper, we provide an experiment to verify the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed model.展开更多
We devise an approach to Bayesian statistics and their applications in the analysis of the Monty Hall problem. We combine knowledge gained through applications of the Maximum Entropy Principle and Nash equilibrium str...We devise an approach to Bayesian statistics and their applications in the analysis of the Monty Hall problem. We combine knowledge gained through applications of the Maximum Entropy Principle and Nash equilibrium strategies to provide results concerning the use of Bayesian approaches unique to the Monty Hall problem. We use a model to describe Monty’s decision process and clarify that Bayesian inference results in an “irrelevant, therefore invariant” hypothesis. We discuss the advantages of Bayesian inference over the frequentist inference in tackling the uneven prior probability Monty Hall variant. We demonstrate that the use of Bayesian statistics conforms to the Maximum Entropy Principle in information theory and Bayesian approach successfully resolves dilemmas in the uneven probability Monty Hall variant. Our findings have applications in the decision making, information theory, bioinformatics, quantum game theory and beyond.展开更多
A model of continuous-time insider trading in which a risk-neutral in-sider possesses two imperfect correlated signals of a risky asset is studied.By conditional expectation theory and filtering theory,we first establ...A model of continuous-time insider trading in which a risk-neutral in-sider possesses two imperfect correlated signals of a risky asset is studied.By conditional expectation theory and filtering theory,we first establish three lemmas:normal corre-lation,equivalent pricing and equivalent profit,which can guarantee to turn our model into a model with insider knowing full information.Then we investigate the impact of the two correlated signals on the market equilibrium consisting of optimal insider trading strategy and semi-strong pricing rule.It shows that in the equilibrium,(1)the market depth is constant over time;(2)if the two noisy signals are not linerly correlated,then all private information of the insider is incorporated into prices in the end while the whole information on the asset value can not incorporated into prices in the end;(3)if the two noisy signals are linear correlated such that the insider can infer the whole information of the asset value,then our model turns into a model with insider knowing full information;(4)if the two noisy signals are the same then the total ex ant profit of the insider is increasing with the noise decreasing,while down to O as the noise going up to infinity;(5)if the two noisy signals are not linear correlated then with one noisy signal fixed,the total ex ante profit of the insider is single-peaked with a unique minimum with respect to the other noisy signal value,and furthermore as the noisy value going to O it gets its maximum,the profit in the case that the real value is observed.展开更多
文摘Cognitive bias,stemming from electronic measurement error and variability in human perception,exists in cognitive electronic warfare and affects the outcomes of conflicts.In this paper,the dynamic game approach is employed to develop a model for cognitive bias induced by incomplete information and measurement errors in cognitive radar countermeasures.The payoffs for both parties are calculated using the radar's anti-jamming strategy matrix A and the jammer's jamming strategy matrix B.With perfect Bayesian equilibrium,a dynamic radar countermeasure model is established,and the impact of cognitive bias is analyzed.Drawing inspiration from the cognitive bias analysis method used in stock market trading,a cognitive bias model for cognitive radar countermeasures is introduced,and its correctness is mathematically proved.A gaming scenario involving the AN/SPY-1 radar and a smart jammer is set up to analyze the influence of cognitive bias on game outcomes.Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
基金Supported by the Major National Science and Technology program (2011ZX03005-002)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60872041, 61072066, 60963023, 60970143)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (JY10000903001, JY10000901034)
文摘The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.
基金This work was supported by Key project of Hunan Provincial Education Department(20A191)Hunan teaching research and reform project(2019-134)+3 种基金Cooperative Education Fund of China Ministry of Education(201702113002,201801193119)Hunan Natural Science Foundation(2018JJ2138)Hunan teaching research and reform project(2019)Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province(2020JJ7007).
文摘A game measurement model considering the attacker’s knowledge background is proposed based on the Bayesian game theory aiming at striking a balance between the protection of sensitive information and the quality of service.We quantified the sensitive level of information according to the user’s personalized sensitive information protection needs.Based on the probability distribution of sensitive level and attacker’s knowledge background type,the strategy combination of service provider and attacker was analyzed,and a game-based sensitive information protection model was constructed.Through the combination of strategies under Bayesian equilibrium,the information entropy was used to measure the leakage of sensitive information.Furthermore,in the paper the influence of the sensitive level of information and the attacker’s knowledge background on the strategy of both sides of the game was considered comprehensively.Further on,the leakage of the user’s sensitive information was measured.Finally,the feasibility of the model was described by experiments.
文摘Wireless ad ho network is becoming a new research fronter, in which security is an important issue. Usually some nodes act maliciously and they are able to do different kinds of Denial of Service (Dos). Because of the limited resource, intrusion detection system (IDS) runs all the time to detect intrusion of the attacker which is a costly overhead. In our model, we use game theory to model the interactions between the intrusion detection system and the attacker, and a realistic model is given by using Bayesian game. We solve the game by finding the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The results of our analysis show that the IDS could work intermittently without compromising on its effectiveness. At the end of this paper, we provide an experiment to verify the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed model.
文摘We devise an approach to Bayesian statistics and their applications in the analysis of the Monty Hall problem. We combine knowledge gained through applications of the Maximum Entropy Principle and Nash equilibrium strategies to provide results concerning the use of Bayesian approaches unique to the Monty Hall problem. We use a model to describe Monty’s decision process and clarify that Bayesian inference results in an “irrelevant, therefore invariant” hypothesis. We discuss the advantages of Bayesian inference over the frequentist inference in tackling the uneven prior probability Monty Hall variant. We demonstrate that the use of Bayesian statistics conforms to the Maximum Entropy Principle in information theory and Bayesian approach successfully resolves dilemmas in the uneven probability Monty Hall variant. Our findings have applications in the decision making, information theory, bioinformatics, quantum game theory and beyond.
文摘A model of continuous-time insider trading in which a risk-neutral in-sider possesses two imperfect correlated signals of a risky asset is studied.By conditional expectation theory and filtering theory,we first establish three lemmas:normal corre-lation,equivalent pricing and equivalent profit,which can guarantee to turn our model into a model with insider knowing full information.Then we investigate the impact of the two correlated signals on the market equilibrium consisting of optimal insider trading strategy and semi-strong pricing rule.It shows that in the equilibrium,(1)the market depth is constant over time;(2)if the two noisy signals are not linerly correlated,then all private information of the insider is incorporated into prices in the end while the whole information on the asset value can not incorporated into prices in the end;(3)if the two noisy signals are linear correlated such that the insider can infer the whole information of the asset value,then our model turns into a model with insider knowing full information;(4)if the two noisy signals are the same then the total ex ant profit of the insider is increasing with the noise decreasing,while down to O as the noise going up to infinity;(5)if the two noisy signals are not linear correlated then with one noisy signal fixed,the total ex ante profit of the insider is single-peaked with a unique minimum with respect to the other noisy signal value,and furthermore as the noisy value going to O it gets its maximum,the profit in the case that the real value is observed.
