The optimal license proportions with and without technology spillover are analyzed with a game-theoretical approach when a patent-holding firm licensed non-drastic process innovation to his incumbent rivals by means o...The optimal license proportions with and without technology spillover are analyzed with a game-theoretical approach when a patent-holding firm licensed non-drastic process innovation to his incumbent rivals by means of a first price sealed bid auction. The optimal strategy is obtained through solving the game by backward induction. It is found that the range of optimal license proportion is narrower when there is spillover compared to the no spillover case.展开更多
文摘The optimal license proportions with and without technology spillover are analyzed with a game-theoretical approach when a patent-holding firm licensed non-drastic process innovation to his incumbent rivals by means of a first price sealed bid auction. The optimal strategy is obtained through solving the game by backward induction. It is found that the range of optimal license proportion is narrower when there is spillover compared to the no spillover case.
