The challenge for supply chain management is to create appropriate supply chain contracts so as to optimize the system performance. To examine the role of asymmetric information in a two-echelon supply chain system an...The challenge for supply chain management is to create appropriate supply chain contracts so as to optimize the system performance. To examine the role of asymmetric information in a two-echelon supply chain system and derive supply chain contracts to deal with existing asymmetric information, a two level supply chain model including one Supplier and one retailer under the demand of price elasticity is developed. By using the principalagent principle and the optimal control theory, three types of supply chain contract, i. e. , a wholesale pricing contract, a two-parameter linear and a two-parameter nonlinear contracts are obtained. In these contracts, the Supplier has asymmetric information about the retailer cost structure. Simulation results show that the two-parameter contracts are more effective strategies to achieve supply chain coordination.展开更多
The paper addresses the decentralized optimal control and stabilization problems for interconnected systems subject to asymmetric information.Compared with previous work,a closed-loop optimal solution to the control p...The paper addresses the decentralized optimal control and stabilization problems for interconnected systems subject to asymmetric information.Compared with previous work,a closed-loop optimal solution to the control problem and sufficient and necessary conditions for the stabilization problem of the interconnected systems are given for the first time.The main challenge lies in three aspects:Firstly,the asymmetric information results in coupling between control and estimation and failure of the separation principle.Secondly,two extra unknown variables are generated by asymmetric information(different information filtration)when solving forward-backward stochastic difference equations.Thirdly,the existence of additive noise makes the study of mean-square boundedness an obstacle.The adopted technique is proving and assuming the linear form of controllers and establishing the equivalence between the two systems with and without additive noise.A dual-motor parallel drive system is presented to demonstrate the validity of the proposed algorithm.展开更多
Credit rationing has been an objective phenomenon in medium-small enterprises credit market of China. By analyzing the present situation of medium-small enterprises credit market of China, this study gives a new credi...Credit rationing has been an objective phenomenon in medium-small enterprises credit market of China. By analyzing the present situation of medium-small enterprises credit market of China, this study gives a new credit rationing model fitting medium-small enterprises credit market of China well. It has been showed in the empirical study that different factor has each different influence on medium-small enterprises credit market; further more, only the change of chastisement factor can make the medium-small enterprises credit market achieve whole success, but other factors can merely get integrant success even though under the most ideal condition.展开更多
The quantity discount contracts are investigated for a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain with asymmetric information when the retailer's cost is disrupted. While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetri...The quantity discount contracts are investigated for a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain with asymmetric information when the retailer's cost is disrupted. While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information, two all-unit quantity discount contract models, fixed expected-profit percentage discount(FEPD) and fixed wholesale-pricing percentage discount(FWPD) under asymmetric information are proposed in a regular scenario. When the retailer's cost distribution fluctuates due to disruptions, the optimal emergency strategies of supply chains are obtained under asymmetric information. Using numerical methods, the impact of cost disruptions on decisions about the regular wholesale price, discount wholesale price, order quantity and expected profits of the retailer, the supplier as well as the total system are analyzed. It is found that the FEPD policy is more robust and adaptable than the FWPD policy in disruption circumstances.展开更多
The cooperative mechanism is one main issue in the decentralized supply chain system, especially in an asymmetric information structure. We analyze the non-cooperative game behavior of a 2-echelon distribution supply ...The cooperative mechanism is one main issue in the decentralized supply chain system, especially in an asymmetric information structure. We analyze the non-cooperative game behavior of a 2-echelon distribution supply chain, compare the results with the system optimal solution, and give the supplier dominated cooperative mechanisms. We also analyze the validity of our contract under the asymmetric retailers' holding cost information and give some useful conclusions.展开更多
The buyer-supplier relationship plays a great role in most economic systems. The buying firm usually tries to find a new supplier who provides products with satisfying quality and lower price. A broad branch of litera...The buyer-supplier relationship plays a great role in most economic systems. The buying firm usually tries to find a new supplier who provides products with satisfying quality and lower price. A broad branch of literature deals with the development of buyer-supplier relationships, but limited research is on the circumstances under which a buyer should terminate such a relationship and switch to a new supplier. In this paper, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) which induces the entrant supplier to report his true cost is considered, and the participation constraint (PC) which ensures the entrant supplier to get at least reservation profit is taken into account. Then the supplier switching model is set up to minimize the buying firm's total procurement cost which includes the transfer payment to the incumbent supplier, the payment to the entrant supplier and the switching cost, and the buying firm's switching cost is considered as a function of the switching quantity. With the theoretical analysis of IC, PC and the proposed model, the optimal supplier switching strategy can be obtained. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and the switching strategy.展开更多
Quantity discount scheme plays an important role in supply chain management. The different quantity discount schemes under symmetric （full） information and asymmetric information, are analyzed by using principal-age...Quantity discount scheme plays an important role in supply chain management. The different quantity discount schemes under symmetric （full） information and asymmetric information, are analyzed by using principal-agent and optimal control theory. As a result, the research reveals that the optimal quantity discount solution under symmetric information is a special case of that under asymmetric information. At the same price, the critical value of quantity discount under asymmetric information is much lower than that under asymmetric information. Therefore, this leads to less cost for retailers and smaller profit for their supplier.展开更多
In contemporary society, the problem of information asymmetry in talent markets has been becoming more prominent. On one hand, the company and candidates fight against each other based on the information available, so...In contemporary society, the problem of information asymmetry in talent markets has been becoming more prominent. On one hand, the company and candidates fight against each other based on the information available, so both of them could make fraud that will make the market level lower and lower. On the other hand, former scholars have studied from enterprises＇ perspective and put forward methods to solve it based on the aspect of improving the technology and standard mechanism, which could not solve the problem of information asymmetry thoroughly. Consequently, this research put up with the idea that the market can reduce information asymmetry through the establishing personnel information database and related platforms, which has a great practical significance on realizing the optimal allocation of the market and saving cost. At the same time, this study discussed the problems of information asymmetry fundamentally, which was of great importance to enrich the related theory research. Specific models were constructed through two perspectives from the enterprise and the candidates. And then two models would be eventually integrated into a large system. Finally, this research put all related information into a system, which was beneficial to the optimal allocation of human resources with constraints of the market environment.展开更多
In this paper, we characterize the players’ behavior in the stock market by the repeated game model with asymmetric information. We show that the discount price process of stock is a martingale driven by Brownian mot...In this paper, we characterize the players’ behavior in the stock market by the repeated game model with asymmetric information. We show that the discount price process of stock is a martingale driven by Brownian motion, and give an endogenous explanation for the random fluctuation of stock price: the randomizations in the market is due to the randomizations in the strategy of the informed player which hopes to avoid revealing his private information. On this basis, through studying the corresponding option pricing problem furtherly, we can give the expression of function<em> φ</em>.展开更多
Along with the vigorous development of the markel economy, the transactions in the market are also increasingly frequent. In all kinds of market transactions, there are more or less inIbrmation asynunetry phenomena. A...Along with the vigorous development of the markel economy, the transactions in the market are also increasingly frequent. In all kinds of market transactions, there are more or less inIbrmation asynunetry phenomena. Asynmaetric information makes supply chain unable to give a real reaction to the relationship between market supply and demand, and the personnel in the channels of supply chain are unable to make the optimal pricing, so that the overall profits are affected. Therefore, asymmetric information should be controlled within the normal range, for the purpose of ensuring the normal operation and healthy development of the market transactions.展开更多
Pollution cost control is key to solve pollution problem.The paper takes pollution control cost of pollution control contract between management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise as research object,consider...Pollution cost control is key to solve pollution problem.The paper takes pollution control cost of pollution control contract between management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise as research object,considers pollution control quality level,pollution control quality inspection and pollution control cost model,and establishes pollution control cost model of management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise,including rational constraints of pollutant discharge enterprise.And it analyzes principal-agent relationship between the two under condition of asymmetric information,and un-observability of pollution control level is shown as hiding information of sewage enterprises.In essence,it is problem of adverse selection in principal-agent.Pollution control cost of management is objective function.The first order condition of pollution control cost of sewage enterprise is transformed into state space equation,and optimal control of problem is solved by using maximum principle.In particular,management authority,as principal,uses pollution control provisions to reward,punish and encourage pollutant discharge enterprises as agents.展开更多
The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions.For both conditions,SCM implementation optional decisio...The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions.For both conditions,SCM implementation optional decision optimizing models have been developed.In these models,both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits.Based upon the principal-agent theory,the models show to what extent a principal(a client)needs to pay more to an agent(a vendor)in a context of asymmetric information.For the client it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system.The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.展开更多
This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terro...This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terrorists complicate defensive resource allocations for the public safety.Simultaneous and sequential game models are developed to investigate the asymmetric information effects on defensive strategies and terrorism risk analysis.The government can detect explicit or implicit signals to support decisions and update its beliefs according to a Bayesian law after it receives a terrorist threat.Analyses of the equilibrium for the signaling game indicate that the optimal government defensive strategy will significantly impact the actions of the terrorists.Asymmetric information is shown to play a crucial role in security decision making and terrorism risk mitigation,with the optimal defensive strategy changing according to terrorists and government capabilities.展开更多
This paper studies the trading behavior of an irrational insider and its influence on the market equilibrium in the presence of market regulation.We find that the market with only one insider with private information ...This paper studies the trading behavior of an irrational insider and its influence on the market equilibrium in the presence of market regulation.We find that the market with only one insider with private information is almost close to a strong efficient market,under the condition of market regulation.In the equilibrium,the probability of the insider being caught trading with private information is zero,which shows that the reasonable behavior of the regulator is to essentially give up regulation.But the market efficiency and the irrational trader’s trading intensity all greatly improve because of the existence of the market regulation.展开更多
the financial support of the National Social Science Foundation of China （14ZDA038）;the National Natural Science Foundation of China （71222302;71373255;71573133）;the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Re...the financial support of the National Social Science Foundation of China （14ZDA038）;the National Natural Science Foundation of China （71222302;71373255;71573133）;the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences （2012RC102）展开更多
This paper investigates agency relationship composed by different risk preference between original equipment manufacturer（ OEM） and contract manufacturer（ CM）. The quality level of contractor CM has a significant ...This paper investigates agency relationship composed by different risk preference between original equipment manufacturer（ OEM） and contract manufacturer（ CM）. The quality level of contractor CM has a significant influence to market demand,and also influences mutual benefits. To improve the level of quality,contractor has to pay the cost price and the effort,which are not observed and private information,so in this agency relationship there may exist adverse selection and moral hazard. OEM designs menu-driven contractual mechanisms to encourage contractor. In this contractual mechanism,contractor takes initiative to reveal its own effort cost information and maximize mutual profits. This paper set up Stackerlberg game model dominated by OEM,then it gives contract parameters through solving the model and it also analyzes property of incentive contract.展开更多
Based on the improvement of interactive relationship between rural information service system and farmers＇ income, accompanied by the serious restriction to its mutual promotion caused by such problems as asymmetric ...Based on the improvement of interactive relationship between rural information service system and farmers＇ income, accompanied by the serious restriction to its mutual promotion caused by such problems as asymmetric information, focusing on introduction of rural information service infrastructure while ignored the application of them, shortage of human resource on information and so on, this paper proposed corresponding measures respectively to promote the benign interaction development between rural information service and farmers＇ income.展开更多
In this conceptual paper,the author develops and presents a strategic decision-making framework that applies game theory to evaluate smart and natural farming approaches in India.In the face of increasing pressures fr...In this conceptual paper,the author develops and presents a strategic decision-making framework that applies game theory to evaluate smart and natural farming approaches in India.In the face of increasing pressures from climate change,resource scarcity,and evolving socio-economic landscapes,agriculture must adapt to the challenges of a volatile,uncertain,complex,and ambiguous(VUCA)world.When integrated with the Provision of Urban Amenities in Rural Areas(PURA)framework,VUCA offers a dynamic system perspective that contextualizes uncertainty and institutional capacity in farming systems.This study applies a modified Spence signaling model to capture how farmers-categorized as smart or natural versus conventional-choose to signal their sustainability credentials in an environment of asymmetric information.Using a combination of payoff matrix modelling,Bayesian belief updating,and evolutionary game simulations,the paper identifies strategic equilibria under varying levels of policy support,consumer trust,and signal cost.Farmers’decisions to adopt smart technologies or organic certifications are modelled as costly but credible signals of quality.These signals are then interpreted by receivers such as consumers,investors,or policymakers,who in turn adjust their support or market preferences.The analysis reveals conditions under which separating,pooling,and semi-separating equilibria emerge,and how these outcomes impact farmer behaviour and systemic sustainability.Case studies from Indian states such as Andhra Pradesh,Karnataka,and Punjab demonstrate how real-world farming programs mirror theoretical outcomes under different signalling strategies.The study also presents a robust methodological structure,combining conceptual modelling with policy simulation and validation through comparative cases.By integrating environmental,technological,and institutional perspectives,this paper contributes a hybrid strategic framework aligned with India’s Green Revolution 2.0 goals.It offers practical recommendations for policy design,infrastructure planning,and market mechanisms that support the scaling of sustainable agricultural practices through credible signalling and game-theoretic insights.展开更多
文摘The challenge for supply chain management is to create appropriate supply chain contracts so as to optimize the system performance. To examine the role of asymmetric information in a two-echelon supply chain system and derive supply chain contracts to deal with existing asymmetric information, a two level supply chain model including one Supplier and one retailer under the demand of price elasticity is developed. By using the principalagent principle and the optimal control theory, three types of supply chain contract, i. e. , a wholesale pricing contract, a two-parameter linear and a two-parameter nonlinear contracts are obtained. In these contracts, the Supplier has asymmetric information about the retailer cost structure. Simulation results show that the two-parameter contracts are more effective strategies to achieve supply chain coordination.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(62273213,62073199,62103241)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province for Innovation and Development Joint Funds(ZR2022LZH001)+4 种基金Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province(ZR2020MF095,ZR2021QF107)Taishan Scholarship Construction Engineeringthe Original Exploratory Program Project of National Natural Science Foundation of China(62250056)Major Basic Research of Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province(ZR2021ZD14)High-level Talent Team Project of Qingdao West Coast New Area(RCTD-JC-2019-05)。
文摘The paper addresses the decentralized optimal control and stabilization problems for interconnected systems subject to asymmetric information.Compared with previous work,a closed-loop optimal solution to the control problem and sufficient and necessary conditions for the stabilization problem of the interconnected systems are given for the first time.The main challenge lies in three aspects:Firstly,the asymmetric information results in coupling between control and estimation and failure of the separation principle.Secondly,two extra unknown variables are generated by asymmetric information(different information filtration)when solving forward-backward stochastic difference equations.Thirdly,the existence of additive noise makes the study of mean-square boundedness an obstacle.The adopted technique is proving and assuming the linear form of controllers and establishing the equivalence between the two systems with and without additive noise.A dual-motor parallel drive system is presented to demonstrate the validity of the proposed algorithm.
文摘Credit rationing has been an objective phenomenon in medium-small enterprises credit market of China. By analyzing the present situation of medium-small enterprises credit market of China, this study gives a new credit rationing model fitting medium-small enterprises credit market of China well. It has been showed in the empirical study that different factor has each different influence on medium-small enterprises credit market; further more, only the change of chastisement factor can make the medium-small enterprises credit market achieve whole success, but other factors can merely get integrant success even though under the most ideal condition.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.70671021)Jiangsu Postdoctoral Foundation (No.0601015C)
文摘The quantity discount contracts are investigated for a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain with asymmetric information when the retailer's cost is disrupted. While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information, two all-unit quantity discount contract models, fixed expected-profit percentage discount(FEPD) and fixed wholesale-pricing percentage discount(FWPD) under asymmetric information are proposed in a regular scenario. When the retailer's cost distribution fluctuates due to disruptions, the optimal emergency strategies of supply chains are obtained under asymmetric information. Using numerical methods, the impact of cost disruptions on decisions about the regular wholesale price, discount wholesale price, order quantity and expected profits of the retailer, the supplier as well as the total system are analyzed. It is found that the FEPD policy is more robust and adaptable than the FWPD policy in disruption circumstances.
基金This project was supported by the National Science Foundation of China(7017015)The Teaching and Research Award Fund for Outstanding Young Teachers in Higher Education Institutions of MOEThe Excellent Young Teachers Fund of MOE and the Project of Suppor
文摘The cooperative mechanism is one main issue in the decentralized supply chain system, especially in an asymmetric information structure. We analyze the non-cooperative game behavior of a 2-echelon distribution supply chain, compare the results with the system optimal solution, and give the supplier dominated cooperative mechanisms. We also analyze the validity of our contract under the asymmetric retailers' holding cost information and give some useful conclusions.
基金Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61004015 and No. 71071106)Program for Changjiang Scholars and Innovative Research Team in University (No. IRT1028)
文摘The buyer-supplier relationship plays a great role in most economic systems. The buying firm usually tries to find a new supplier who provides products with satisfying quality and lower price. A broad branch of literature deals with the development of buyer-supplier relationships, but limited research is on the circumstances under which a buyer should terminate such a relationship and switch to a new supplier. In this paper, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) which induces the entrant supplier to report his true cost is considered, and the participation constraint (PC) which ensures the entrant supplier to get at least reservation profit is taken into account. Then the supplier switching model is set up to minimize the buying firm's total procurement cost which includes the transfer payment to the incumbent supplier, the payment to the entrant supplier and the switching cost, and the buying firm's switching cost is considered as a function of the switching quantity. With the theoretical analysis of IC, PC and the proposed model, the optimal supplier switching strategy can be obtained. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and the switching strategy.
文摘Quantity discount scheme plays an important role in supply chain management. The different quantity discount schemes under symmetric （full） information and asymmetric information, are analyzed by using principal-agent and optimal control theory. As a result, the research reveals that the optimal quantity discount solution under symmetric information is a special case of that under asymmetric information. At the same price, the critical value of quantity discount under asymmetric information is much lower than that under asymmetric information. Therefore, this leads to less cost for retailers and smaller profit for their supplier.
文摘In contemporary society, the problem of information asymmetry in talent markets has been becoming more prominent. On one hand, the company and candidates fight against each other based on the information available, so both of them could make fraud that will make the market level lower and lower. On the other hand, former scholars have studied from enterprises＇ perspective and put forward methods to solve it based on the aspect of improving the technology and standard mechanism, which could not solve the problem of information asymmetry thoroughly. Consequently, this research put up with the idea that the market can reduce information asymmetry through the establishing personnel information database and related platforms, which has a great practical significance on realizing the optimal allocation of the market and saving cost. At the same time, this study discussed the problems of information asymmetry fundamentally, which was of great importance to enrich the related theory research. Specific models were constructed through two perspectives from the enterprise and the candidates. And then two models would be eventually integrated into a large system. Finally, this research put all related information into a system, which was beneficial to the optimal allocation of human resources with constraints of the market environment.
文摘In this paper, we characterize the players’ behavior in the stock market by the repeated game model with asymmetric information. We show that the discount price process of stock is a martingale driven by Brownian motion, and give an endogenous explanation for the random fluctuation of stock price: the randomizations in the market is due to the randomizations in the strategy of the informed player which hopes to avoid revealing his private information. On this basis, through studying the corresponding option pricing problem furtherly, we can give the expression of function<em> φ</em>.
文摘Along with the vigorous development of the markel economy, the transactions in the market are also increasingly frequent. In all kinds of market transactions, there are more or less inIbrmation asynunetry phenomena. Asynmaetric information makes supply chain unable to give a real reaction to the relationship between market supply and demand, and the personnel in the channels of supply chain are unable to make the optimal pricing, so that the overall profits are affected. Therefore, asymmetric information should be controlled within the normal range, for the purpose of ensuring the normal operation and healthy development of the market transactions.
基金2021 Ph.D.Program of Hainan Normal University(RC2100004363)。
文摘Pollution cost control is key to solve pollution problem.The paper takes pollution control cost of pollution control contract between management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise as research object,considers pollution control quality level,pollution control quality inspection and pollution control cost model,and establishes pollution control cost model of management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise,including rational constraints of pollutant discharge enterprise.And it analyzes principal-agent relationship between the two under condition of asymmetric information,and un-observability of pollution control level is shown as hiding information of sewage enterprises.In essence,it is problem of adverse selection in principal-agent.Pollution control cost of management is objective function.The first order condition of pollution control cost of sewage enterprise is transformed into state space equation,and optimal control of problem is solved by using maximum principle.In particular,management authority,as principal,uses pollution control provisions to reward,punish and encourage pollutant discharge enterprises as agents.
基金Supported by the Social Science Foundation of China(18BJL017)the Natural Science Foundation of Liaoning Science and Technology Bureau(20170540439)
文摘The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions.For both conditions,SCM implementation optional decision optimizing models have been developed.In these models,both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits.Based upon the principal-agent theory,the models show to what extent a principal(a client)needs to pay more to an agent(a vendor)in a context of asymmetric information.For the client it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system.The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.
基金Supported by the Key Technologies Research and DevelopmentProgram of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan of China (No 2006BAK04A08)
文摘This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terrorists complicate defensive resource allocations for the public safety.Simultaneous and sequential game models are developed to investigate the asymmetric information effects on defensive strategies and terrorism risk analysis.The government can detect explicit or implicit signals to support decisions and update its beliefs according to a Bayesian law after it receives a terrorist threat.Analyses of the equilibrium for the signaling game indicate that the optimal government defensive strategy will significantly impact the actions of the terrorists.Asymmetric information is shown to play a crucial role in security decision making and terrorism risk mitigation,with the optimal defensive strategy changing according to terrorists and government capabilities.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 11971097, 11201060,11126107)Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universitiesthe financial support from the General Project of Science and Technology Plan of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education (No. KM202010017001)
文摘This paper studies the trading behavior of an irrational insider and its influence on the market equilibrium in the presence of market regulation.We find that the market with only one insider with private information is almost close to a strong efficient market,under the condition of market regulation.In the equilibrium,the probability of the insider being caught trading with private information is zero,which shows that the reasonable behavior of the regulator is to essentially give up regulation.But the market efficiency and the irrational trader’s trading intensity all greatly improve because of the existence of the market regulation.
基金the financial support of the National Social Science Foundation of China (14ZDA038)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71222302+2 种基金7137325571573133)the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences (2012RC102)
文摘the financial support of the National Social Science Foundation of China （14ZDA038）;the National Natural Science Foundation of China （71222302;71373255;71573133）;the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences （2012RC102）
基金supported by National Natural Science Fund(No.71172105)
文摘This paper investigates agency relationship composed by different risk preference between original equipment manufacturer（ OEM） and contract manufacturer（ CM）. The quality level of contractor CM has a significant influence to market demand,and also influences mutual benefits. To improve the level of quality,contractor has to pay the cost price and the effort,which are not observed and private information,so in this agency relationship there may exist adverse selection and moral hazard. OEM designs menu-driven contractual mechanisms to encourage contractor. In this contractual mechanism,contractor takes initiative to reveal its own effort cost information and maximize mutual profits. This paper set up Stackerlberg game model dominated by OEM,then it gives contract parameters through solving the model and it also analyzes property of incentive contract.
基金Supported by the Federation of Society and Science Planned Fund (2007-JJ41)Strengthen the Countryside Information Service to Promote Chongqing New Rural Reconstruction
文摘Based on the improvement of interactive relationship between rural information service system and farmers＇ income, accompanied by the serious restriction to its mutual promotion caused by such problems as asymmetric information, focusing on introduction of rural information service infrastructure while ignored the application of them, shortage of human resource on information and so on, this paper proposed corresponding measures respectively to promote the benign interaction development between rural information service and farmers＇ income.
文摘In this conceptual paper,the author develops and presents a strategic decision-making framework that applies game theory to evaluate smart and natural farming approaches in India.In the face of increasing pressures from climate change,resource scarcity,and evolving socio-economic landscapes,agriculture must adapt to the challenges of a volatile,uncertain,complex,and ambiguous(VUCA)world.When integrated with the Provision of Urban Amenities in Rural Areas(PURA)framework,VUCA offers a dynamic system perspective that contextualizes uncertainty and institutional capacity in farming systems.This study applies a modified Spence signaling model to capture how farmers-categorized as smart or natural versus conventional-choose to signal their sustainability credentials in an environment of asymmetric information.Using a combination of payoff matrix modelling,Bayesian belief updating,and evolutionary game simulations,the paper identifies strategic equilibria under varying levels of policy support,consumer trust,and signal cost.Farmers’decisions to adopt smart technologies or organic certifications are modelled as costly but credible signals of quality.These signals are then interpreted by receivers such as consumers,investors,or policymakers,who in turn adjust their support or market preferences.The analysis reveals conditions under which separating,pooling,and semi-separating equilibria emerge,and how these outcomes impact farmer behaviour and systemic sustainability.Case studies from Indian states such as Andhra Pradesh,Karnataka,and Punjab demonstrate how real-world farming programs mirror theoretical outcomes under different signalling strategies.The study also presents a robust methodological structure,combining conceptual modelling with policy simulation and validation through comparative cases.By integrating environmental,technological,and institutional perspectives,this paper contributes a hybrid strategic framework aligned with India’s Green Revolution 2.0 goals.It offers practical recommendations for policy design,infrastructure planning,and market mechanisms that support the scaling of sustainable agricultural practices through credible signalling and game-theoretic insights.
