This article revisits the concept of epistemological rupture by questioning the stark division between scientific and non-scientific thought. Drawing on the theory of representation, it contends that both forms of kno...This article revisits the concept of epistemological rupture by questioning the stark division between scientific and non-scientific thought. Drawing on the theory of representation, it contends that both forms of knowledge are socially constructed, moulded by communication, norms and group dynamics. Rather than labelling non-scientific thought as flawed or regressive, the discussion shows how decontextualization and recontextualization processes apply equally to everyday ‘natural' knowledge and formal science,exposing the social and historical contingencies shaping concepts. Consequently, rupture appears less a sudden break than a gradual threshold reached through dialectical transformations in cognition and society. Rather than conferring total superiority on science, ruptures highlight how certain discourses gain legitimacy while others become ‘non-knowledge'. The article concludes that science's dominance reflects broader power relationships and evolving modes of production and validation. By situating epistemological rupture within these processes, it illuminates how different knowledge forms coexist, evolve and sometimes conflict in stratified social fields—ultimately challenging a simplistic binary between scientific progress and supposedly primitive or natural thought. This viewpoint opens new possibilities for examining the shifting boundaries between rational explanations and the shared beliefs shaping collective reality and daily life.展开更多
文摘This article revisits the concept of epistemological rupture by questioning the stark division between scientific and non-scientific thought. Drawing on the theory of representation, it contends that both forms of knowledge are socially constructed, moulded by communication, norms and group dynamics. Rather than labelling non-scientific thought as flawed or regressive, the discussion shows how decontextualization and recontextualization processes apply equally to everyday ‘natural' knowledge and formal science,exposing the social and historical contingencies shaping concepts. Consequently, rupture appears less a sudden break than a gradual threshold reached through dialectical transformations in cognition and society. Rather than conferring total superiority on science, ruptures highlight how certain discourses gain legitimacy while others become ‘non-knowledge'. The article concludes that science's dominance reflects broader power relationships and evolving modes of production and validation. By situating epistemological rupture within these processes, it illuminates how different knowledge forms coexist, evolve and sometimes conflict in stratified social fields—ultimately challenging a simplistic binary between scientific progress and supposedly primitive or natural thought. This viewpoint opens new possibilities for examining the shifting boundaries between rational explanations and the shared beliefs shaping collective reality and daily life.
