In the context of historical Palestine, the Palestinian and Jewish demography are deeply embedded （Goldsheider, 1991; Freidlander, 2002）. The growth and structure of the populations are one of the most important too...In the context of historical Palestine, the Palestinian and Jewish demography are deeply embedded （Goldsheider, 1991; Freidlander, 2002）. The growth and structure of the populations are one of the most important tools for the control of the territory （Dahlan, 1989）. Jewish immigration was and is still considered as the single most important mean for the conquest of the land （Courbage, 2005）. Yet this is only a partial truth （Fargues, 2000）. Fertility, especially when it is natural at its peak or still very high is also a very significant asset, which is likely to reverse internal equilibrium among the different forces shaping the two societies （Courbage ＆ Todd, 2011; Ettinger, 2011）. Hence, Jews and Palestinians have embarked since decades into a demographic competition （Faraoune, personal communication, December 19, 1992; Anson ＆ Avinoam, 1996）, with this extraordinary result, that in a matter of a century （1948-2048） this small piece of land will have undergone the highest population growth on earth, equivalent to sub Saharan Africa （Faitelson, 2008; Courbage ＆ Fargues, 1997）. It is likely output is not less important to define the future nature of historical Palestine： one or two states （Baskin, 2005; Courbage, 2008）？ And if the two states solution is in effect, what kind of states would it be？ After presenting the recent trends of Palestinian demography in the context of historical Palestine since the first intifada and the aftermath of the second intifada, this essay will focus on future developments, i.e. the likely population dynamics of the Palestinian territory from 2011 until 2048, and of its different components, namely fertility. Palestinian population growth during the next four decades will be compared to that of the future Israeli population and the policy components of this differential population growth will be evaluated both in the context of historical Palestine and in the context of the Jewish State in its 1948 borders （Jews and Palestinians of 1948）. The most serious demographic challenges, （which are not those of an overall ＂equilibrium＂ between Palestinian and Jewish populations as very often claimed）, are very precisely delineated in the ground. These are, first, the question of the peopling of the settlements （Be-Tselem, 2002）. their population is likely to explode from 560,000 settlers now to 1.7 million in 2048, thanks to their extremely high fertility, low mortality, high immigration and ＂population momentum＂ （Central Bureau of Statistics, 2013; Courbage, 2006）. From 18% of the overall population of the West Bank they could reach 29% in 2048, a clear defiance to the possibility of statehood in Palestine. Besides, statehood in Palestine is also threatened by the fact that East-Jerusalem, the likely capital of the Palestinian state is also threatened by the expansionist demography of the Jewish settlers, both in the so-called ＂neighborhoods＂, those settlements close to Jerusalem but which are according to international law an integral part of the West Bank （annexed by Israel in 1967）, and inside the Old city. In Jerusalem, besides Jewish immigration to the neighborhoods from the densely and poor areas of West Jerusalem, fertility trends have now been reversed to advantage of the Jews as compared to the Palestinians in the Holy city （Della Pergola, 2001）. This presentation will deal also with the population trends of the Palestinian population from now on until 2048 （Dalen ＆ Petersen, 2004; Courbage, 1999）. Under the impact of a higher fertility, and a population momentum clearly to its benefit, the population of Gaza （all Palestinians） could approach the Palestinian population of the West Bank： 4.0 in Gaza, 4.3 in the WB （Clarens, 2011）. Yet, the slight majority in the West Bank comes from the Palestinians in Jerusalem, whose political status is still vague. A larger share of the Palestinian population living in the Gaza strip rather than in the West bank is probably not devoid of political implications. For the policy makers it is not easy to run against demographic trends, especially when they are largely guided and decided by the other State which shares the same land. Yet, it is of utmost importance to be fully aware of the likely evolution of the demographic landscape in Palestine and to prepare the demographic but mostly non-demographic policy measures to counterbalance their effects.展开更多
文摘In the context of historical Palestine, the Palestinian and Jewish demography are deeply embedded （Goldsheider, 1991; Freidlander, 2002）. The growth and structure of the populations are one of the most important tools for the control of the territory （Dahlan, 1989）. Jewish immigration was and is still considered as the single most important mean for the conquest of the land （Courbage, 2005）. Yet this is only a partial truth （Fargues, 2000）. Fertility, especially when it is natural at its peak or still very high is also a very significant asset, which is likely to reverse internal equilibrium among the different forces shaping the two societies （Courbage ＆ Todd, 2011; Ettinger, 2011）. Hence, Jews and Palestinians have embarked since decades into a demographic competition （Faraoune, personal communication, December 19, 1992; Anson ＆ Avinoam, 1996）, with this extraordinary result, that in a matter of a century （1948-2048） this small piece of land will have undergone the highest population growth on earth, equivalent to sub Saharan Africa （Faitelson, 2008; Courbage ＆ Fargues, 1997）. It is likely output is not less important to define the future nature of historical Palestine： one or two states （Baskin, 2005; Courbage, 2008）？ And if the two states solution is in effect, what kind of states would it be？ After presenting the recent trends of Palestinian demography in the context of historical Palestine since the first intifada and the aftermath of the second intifada, this essay will focus on future developments, i.e. the likely population dynamics of the Palestinian territory from 2011 until 2048, and of its different components, namely fertility. Palestinian population growth during the next four decades will be compared to that of the future Israeli population and the policy components of this differential population growth will be evaluated both in the context of historical Palestine and in the context of the Jewish State in its 1948 borders （Jews and Palestinians of 1948）. The most serious demographic challenges, （which are not those of an overall ＂equilibrium＂ between Palestinian and Jewish populations as very often claimed）, are very precisely delineated in the ground. These are, first, the question of the peopling of the settlements （Be-Tselem, 2002）. their population is likely to explode from 560,000 settlers now to 1.7 million in 2048, thanks to their extremely high fertility, low mortality, high immigration and ＂population momentum＂ （Central Bureau of Statistics, 2013; Courbage, 2006）. From 18% of the overall population of the West Bank they could reach 29% in 2048, a clear defiance to the possibility of statehood in Palestine. Besides, statehood in Palestine is also threatened by the fact that East-Jerusalem, the likely capital of the Palestinian state is also threatened by the expansionist demography of the Jewish settlers, both in the so-called ＂neighborhoods＂, those settlements close to Jerusalem but which are according to international law an integral part of the West Bank （annexed by Israel in 1967）, and inside the Old city. In Jerusalem, besides Jewish immigration to the neighborhoods from the densely and poor areas of West Jerusalem, fertility trends have now been reversed to advantage of the Jews as compared to the Palestinians in the Holy city （Della Pergola, 2001）. This presentation will deal also with the population trends of the Palestinian population from now on until 2048 （Dalen ＆ Petersen, 2004; Courbage, 1999）. Under the impact of a higher fertility, and a population momentum clearly to its benefit, the population of Gaza （all Palestinians） could approach the Palestinian population of the West Bank： 4.0 in Gaza, 4.3 in the WB （Clarens, 2011）. Yet, the slight majority in the West Bank comes from the Palestinians in Jerusalem, whose political status is still vague. A larger share of the Palestinian population living in the Gaza strip rather than in the West bank is probably not devoid of political implications. For the policy makers it is not easy to run against demographic trends, especially when they are largely guided and decided by the other State which shares the same land. Yet, it is of utmost importance to be fully aware of the likely evolution of the demographic landscape in Palestine and to prepare the demographic but mostly non-demographic policy measures to counterbalance their effects.
