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The Impacts of Drug Price Regulations in China 被引量:1
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作者 Yi Liu Juliang Zhang +2 位作者 tcecheng Yihong Ru Guowei Hua 《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 SCIE EI CSCD 2019年第6期674-693,共20页
To lower pharmaceutical expenditure,the Chinese government has replaced the Fixed Percent Markup (FPM) policy with the policies of the Separation of Outpatient Pharmacies from Hospitals (SOPH) and the Zero Markup Drug... To lower pharmaceutical expenditure,the Chinese government has replaced the Fixed Percent Markup (FPM) policy with the policies of the Separation of Outpatient Pharmacies from Hospitals (SOPH) and the Zero Markup Drug (ZMD).We build a multistage game theoretic model comprising a hospital and a drugstore to analyze the policies' impacts on the providers' drug selection and pricing behaviors.By comparing the equihibrium outcomes,we draw the following conclusions:(i) FPM,especially for one imposing a strict margin ceiling,actually induces an expensive prescription given patients' great compliance.(ii) Both SOPH and ZMD can conditionally lower patients' expenditure,and their performances rely on the hospital's selection.(iii) A proper rate of insurance coverage and a removal of drug rebate are helpful to improve the policies' performance. 展开更多
关键词 DRUG PRICE REGULATIONS patients' EXPENDITURE healthcare REFORM GAME theory
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How do Normal Traders and Sharp Traders Make Profits in the Chinese Security Market?
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作者 Mingyang Zhang Juliang Zhang +1 位作者 tcecheng Guowei Hua 《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 SCIE EI CSCD 2020年第2期203-234,共32页
In this paper,we consider the strategic interaction between the normal and sharp traders in a dynamic limit-order security market and its impact on the Chinese security market at different market volatility levels.We ... In this paper,we consider the strategic interaction between the normal and sharp traders in a dynamic limit-order security market and its impact on the Chinese security market at different market volatility levels.We find that when the proportion of sharp traders is less than a threshold in an orderdriven market,the sharp traders who submit limit orders will get more returns than the normal traders.The participation of sharp traders in the market can increase the total social welfare of all the traders.In addition,we show that:(1)when the market volatility level is generally low,the short-term sharp traders benefit from larger volatility;(2)when the market volatility level is generally high,the insider/cheating sharp traders with high-frequent trading rather than the short-term sharp traders benefit from extreme high volatility;(3)when the market volatility level is moderate,the sharp traders can increase market liquidity. 展开更多
关键词 SHARP TRADER ORDER-DRIVEN MARKET limit-order strategic interaction
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