To address the issue of revenue distribution between government departments and enterprises in the operation of public data authorization,an evolutionary game model was constructed for both government and enterprise p...To address the issue of revenue distribution between government departments and enterprises in the operation of public data authorization,an evolutionary game model was constructed for both government and enterprise parties.The impacts of different incentive levels and revenue distribution ratios on the strategic choices and evolutionary trends of both government and enterprise were analyzed.It was found that when the government chose a strategy of weak authorization and strong regulation,enterprises showed a higher tendency to actively participate in public data sharing.In addition,when the revenue distribution ratio between government and enterprise was 3:7,the game evolution of both parties tended to be stable,reaching a balanced state that is beneficial and sustainable for both parties.展开更多
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72272140,72334006,72192843)。
文摘To address the issue of revenue distribution between government departments and enterprises in the operation of public data authorization,an evolutionary game model was constructed for both government and enterprise parties.The impacts of different incentive levels and revenue distribution ratios on the strategic choices and evolutionary trends of both government and enterprise were analyzed.It was found that when the government chose a strategy of weak authorization and strong regulation,enterprises showed a higher tendency to actively participate in public data sharing.In addition,when the revenue distribution ratio between government and enterprise was 3:7,the game evolution of both parties tended to be stable,reaching a balanced state that is beneficial and sustainable for both parties.
