We propose in this paper a prophylactic treatment strategy for a predator-prey system.The objective is to fight against the propagation of an infectious disease within two populations,one of which preys on the other.T...We propose in this paper a prophylactic treatment strategy for a predator-prey system.The objective is to fight against the propagation of an infectious disease within two populations,one of which preys on the other.This propagation is modeled by means of an SIS(susceptible-infectious-susceptible)epidemic model with vital dynamics and infection propagation in both species through contact and predation,including mortality rates in both populations due directly to the disease.Treatment strategies are represented by new parameters modeling the uptake rates in the populations.We analyze the effect of various treatment strategy scenarios(prey only,predator only,or both)via their uptake rates and possible cost structures,on the size of the infected populations.We illustrate if and when applying such preventive treatments lead to a disease prevalence drop in both populations.We conduct our study using an optimal control model seeking to minimize the treatment cost(s),subject to the transmission dynamics and predator-prey dynamics.展开更多
Vaccination has become an integral part of public health,since an increase in overall vaccination in a given population contributes to a decline in infectious diseases and mortality.Vaccination also contributes to a l...Vaccination has become an integral part of public health,since an increase in overall vaccination in a given population contributes to a decline in infectious diseases and mortality.Vaccination also contributes to a lower rate of infection even for nonvaccinators due to herd immunity((Brisson and Edmunds,2002)).In this work we model human decision-making(with respect to a vaccination program in a single-payer health care provider country)using a leader-follower game framework.We then extend our model to a discrete dynamic game,where time passing is modelled by risk perception changes among population groups considering whether or not to vaccinate.The risk perception changes are encapsulated by probability transition matrices.We assume that the singlepayer provider has a given fixed budget which would not be sufficient to cover 100%of a new vaccine for the entire population.To increase the potential coverage,we propose the introduction of a partial vaccine adoption policy,whereby an individual would pay a portion of the vaccine price and the single payer would support the rest for the entire population.We show how this policy,together with changes in risk perceptions regarding vaccination,impact the strategic decisions of individuals in each group,the policy cost under budgetary constraints and,ultimately,how it impacts the overall uptake of the vaccine in the entire population.展开更多
基金This work was supported by an Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council Discovery Accelerator Supplement,grant number 401285 of the first author.
文摘We propose in this paper a prophylactic treatment strategy for a predator-prey system.The objective is to fight against the propagation of an infectious disease within two populations,one of which preys on the other.This propagation is modeled by means of an SIS(susceptible-infectious-susceptible)epidemic model with vital dynamics and infection propagation in both species through contact and predation,including mortality rates in both populations due directly to the disease.Treatment strategies are represented by new parameters modeling the uptake rates in the populations.We analyze the effect of various treatment strategy scenarios(prey only,predator only,or both)via their uptake rates and possible cost structures,on the size of the infected populations.We illustrate if and when applying such preventive treatments lead to a disease prevalence drop in both populations.We conduct our study using an optimal control model seeking to minimize the treatment cost(s),subject to the transmission dynamics and predator-prey dynamics.
基金I would like to acknowledge the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada Discovery Grant program,with grant number 400684This grant supported the work of the first and second authors.
文摘Vaccination has become an integral part of public health,since an increase in overall vaccination in a given population contributes to a decline in infectious diseases and mortality.Vaccination also contributes to a lower rate of infection even for nonvaccinators due to herd immunity((Brisson and Edmunds,2002)).In this work we model human decision-making(with respect to a vaccination program in a single-payer health care provider country)using a leader-follower game framework.We then extend our model to a discrete dynamic game,where time passing is modelled by risk perception changes among population groups considering whether or not to vaccinate.The risk perception changes are encapsulated by probability transition matrices.We assume that the singlepayer provider has a given fixed budget which would not be sufficient to cover 100%of a new vaccine for the entire population.To increase the potential coverage,we propose the introduction of a partial vaccine adoption policy,whereby an individual would pay a portion of the vaccine price and the single payer would support the rest for the entire population.We show how this policy,together with changes in risk perceptions regarding vaccination,impact the strategic decisions of individuals in each group,the policy cost under budgetary constraints and,ultimately,how it impacts the overall uptake of the vaccine in the entire population.
