In the science fiction novel titled The Planet of the Apes （1963）, Pierre Boulle tells a story about a completely reversed world where the apes dominate the humans. Coming from the normal world that is ours, a small...In the science fiction novel titled The Planet of the Apes （1963）, Pierre Boulle tells a story about a completely reversed world where the apes dominate the humans. Coming from the normal world that is ours, a small group of people is totally embarrassed and confused by observing this strange world. On the planet of the apes that they have discovered, it is the apes that are more intelligent than the humans. On the earth, it was the other way around. That observation results in their perplexity. The two communities, human and simian, bear with one another the relationship that corresponds to what Lotman calls ＂enantiomorphic pairings＂. In this context, a series of questions deserves to be raised： Is a ＂common language＂ possible between the two communities in the enantiomorphic pairings？ If the answer is yes, under what conditions could they succeed in opening up a space where they can have something in common？ In rereading The Planet of the Apes with reference to Lotman＇s semiotics of culture, we would like to formulate a response to those questions. Our claim is that the experience of finitude of one＇s own language can make possible an access to the new form of universality requisite for the cross-cultural communication： commonality without common points.展开更多
文摘In the science fiction novel titled The Planet of the Apes （1963）, Pierre Boulle tells a story about a completely reversed world where the apes dominate the humans. Coming from the normal world that is ours, a small group of people is totally embarrassed and confused by observing this strange world. On the planet of the apes that they have discovered, it is the apes that are more intelligent than the humans. On the earth, it was the other way around. That observation results in their perplexity. The two communities, human and simian, bear with one another the relationship that corresponds to what Lotman calls ＂enantiomorphic pairings＂. In this context, a series of questions deserves to be raised： Is a ＂common language＂ possible between the two communities in the enantiomorphic pairings？ If the answer is yes, under what conditions could they succeed in opening up a space where they can have something in common？ In rereading The Planet of the Apes with reference to Lotman＇s semiotics of culture, we would like to formulate a response to those questions. Our claim is that the experience of finitude of one＇s own language can make possible an access to the new form of universality requisite for the cross-cultural communication： commonality without common points.
