We examine the relationship between returnee chief executive officers(CEOs)and audit fees in China using robust econometric modeling with 25,630 firm-year observations between 2008 and 2020.A returnee CEO is a Chinese...We examine the relationship between returnee chief executive officers(CEOs)and audit fees in China using robust econometric modeling with 25,630 firm-year observations between 2008 and 2020.A returnee CEO is a Chinese CEO who has previously worked or studied outside China's mainland.Consis-tent with the supply-side argument that returnees improve governance and reduce audit risk,having a returnee CEO is negatively associated with audit fees.This relationship is not sensitive to the source of foreign experience.Firms with(vs.without)returnee CEOs pay lower audit fees.This effect is particu-larly pronounced for state-owned enterprises.Poorly governed,highly com-plex and risky firms benefit most from returnee CEOs in terms of lower audit fees.Our findings are robust across various tests.展开更多
基金funded by the Xijing University Special FundforHigh-LevelTalents(XJ24B02).
文摘We examine the relationship between returnee chief executive officers(CEOs)and audit fees in China using robust econometric modeling with 25,630 firm-year observations between 2008 and 2020.A returnee CEO is a Chinese CEO who has previously worked or studied outside China's mainland.Consis-tent with the supply-side argument that returnees improve governance and reduce audit risk,having a returnee CEO is negatively associated with audit fees.This relationship is not sensitive to the source of foreign experience.Firms with(vs.without)returnee CEOs pay lower audit fees.This effect is particu-larly pronounced for state-owned enterprises.Poorly governed,highly com-plex and risky firms benefit most from returnee CEOs in terms of lower audit fees.Our findings are robust across various tests.
