We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than lo...We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than localgovernment-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cashbased payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts.But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.展开更多
A 29-year-old man was presented to the emergency department with a dull pain in the right upper abdomen for 2 days.He had a history of chronic infection with hepatitis B virus(HBV)for 11 years.The abdominal computed t...A 29-year-old man was presented to the emergency department with a dull pain in the right upper abdomen for 2 days.He had a history of chronic infection with hepatitis B virus(HBV)for 11 years.The abdominal computed tomography(CT)scan showed multiple low-density nodules fused into a clump,with sizes ranging from approximately 6-13 cm in the left liver.Postoperative pathology confirmed advanced hepatocellular carcinoma with lung metastatic tumors.After 36 months’systematic treatment,the patient experienced a nasal alar mass growing rapidly(Figure 1A,B).展开更多
We examine what determines a firm's decision to disclose a self-assessment report on its internal control (IC) system and to further attain an auditor's attestation on the report, using a sample of firms from the ...We examine what determines a firm's decision to disclose a self-assessment report on its internal control (IC) system and to further attain an auditor's attestation on the report, using a sample of firms from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2006-2010. We hypothesize and find supporting evidence that the likelihood of having voluntary disclosure of IC self-assessment with an auditor's attestation is positively related to future equity refinancing, mutuM-fund shareholding, and whether the firm is controlled by the government, especially the central government. Our study also takes the identification problem into consideration, as our sample includes firms with IC weaknesses/deficiencies. Our study not only makes an incremental contribution to the literature, but also has practical implications, especially for regulators and investors in China.展开更多
基金the financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC No.71272074)the Excellent Young Professors Program of the Shanghai Government
文摘We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than localgovernment-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cashbased payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts.But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.
文摘A 29-year-old man was presented to the emergency department with a dull pain in the right upper abdomen for 2 days.He had a history of chronic infection with hepatitis B virus(HBV)for 11 years.The abdominal computed tomography(CT)scan showed multiple low-density nodules fused into a clump,with sizes ranging from approximately 6-13 cm in the left liver.Postoperative pathology confirmed advanced hepatocellular carcinoma with lung metastatic tumors.After 36 months’systematic treatment,the patient experienced a nasal alar mass growing rapidly(Figure 1A,B).
基金We would like to thank Steven Wang, Clive Lennox, Charles Chen, Yaw Mensah, Linda Myers, Yue Heng and workshop participants at Beijing University, Nanjing University, Fudan University, University of International Business and Economics, California State University at Northridge, the Chinese Accounting Professors Association of North American annual conference, and the AAA annual meeting for helpful comments. We acknowledges the financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71172035, 71272074 and 71572046).
文摘We examine what determines a firm's decision to disclose a self-assessment report on its internal control (IC) system and to further attain an auditor's attestation on the report, using a sample of firms from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2006-2010. We hypothesize and find supporting evidence that the likelihood of having voluntary disclosure of IC self-assessment with an auditor's attestation is positively related to future equity refinancing, mutuM-fund shareholding, and whether the firm is controlled by the government, especially the central government. Our study also takes the identification problem into consideration, as our sample includes firms with IC weaknesses/deficiencies. Our study not only makes an incremental contribution to the literature, but also has practical implications, especially for regulators and investors in China.