Managing supply chain partnerships for competitive advantage is receiving considerable recognition among both academic researchers and industry executives. Trust is an essential factor for a company to collaborate wit...Managing supply chain partnerships for competitive advantage is receiving considerable recognition among both academic researchers and industry executives. Trust is an essential factor for a company to collaborate with its partner through supply chain （SC）. In this paper we analyze the factors of trust relationship in green supply chain （GSC）. A conceptual model of determinants of trust in GSC is presented. Finally, research propositions are discussed.展开更多
The investment in green technology in the process of product design and production is viewed asa powerful tool for sustainable development and carbon emission reduction However,the substantial cost and pressure of com...The investment in green technology in the process of product design and production is viewed asa powerful tool for sustainable development and carbon emission reduction However,the substantial cost and pressure of competition weaken incentives for manufacturers to engage in green technology.In this paper,we consider two competitive manufacturer-retailer supply chains,where each manufacturer sells partially substitutable products through the exclusive retailer,study green technology investment selection by manufacturers,and examine the efficacy of retailer cost sharing scheme.Our analysis shows that a dominant equilibrium strategy for both manufacturers is to invest in green technologies,whether cost sharing is in place or not.Retailer sharing the cost of manufac turer green technology investment can avoid firms'preference confliction over the green technology investment and improve social welfare simultaneously when both the cost-sharing rate and the degree of product/channel competition are relatively low.We also find that green technology investment by manufacturers does not necessarily curb total carbon emission,and the cost sharing can either strengthen or weaken the carbon emission reduction of green technology investment.展开更多
With increasing public environmental awareness,green activities in retail and distribution processes have become crucial tools for retailers to boost demand and enhance competitiveness.This study develops an analytica...With increasing public environmental awareness,green activities in retail and distribution processes have become crucial tools for retailers to boost demand and enhance competitiveness.This study develops an analytical model to study the green investment choices of two differentiated retailers dealing with a common green manufacturer.It also explores the impacts of these investment choices on the manufacturer's operational decisions,channel efficiency,consumer welfare,and the environment.We derive three main results.First,the powerful retailer always favors green investments,whereas the less powerful(inferior)retailer may either prefer or avoid green investments.The fiercer the interretailer competition,the lower the willingness of the inferior retailer to introduce green investments.Second,although all supply chain parties may disagree on their preferences for retailers'green investments,a bilateral green investment(i.e.,both retailers make green investments)can reach an incentive alignment for all firms if the differentiation between retailers is low enough and the competition between them is not substantially fierce.Moreover,a bilateral green investment improves consumer welfare and channel efficiency because of the great demand expansion and double marginalization reduction.Third,the retailers'green investments can motivate the manufacturer to produce greener products,but they do not necessarily benefit the environment.We show that the supply chain's economic sustainability aligns with its environmental sustainability only if the environmental improvement efficiency of green investments is substantially high.We further examine the impact of retailers with differentiated green investment abilities and the manufacturer's green investment efficiency to verify the robustness of the main results.展开更多
A critical problem plaguing regulators in promoting pharmaceutical innovation is to design and select efficient incentive policies. In this study, we develop a stylized model comprising a regulator and two representat...A critical problem plaguing regulators in promoting pharmaceutical innovation is to design and select efficient incentive policies. In this study, we develop a stylized model comprising a regulator and two representative drug producers to evaluate the effects of three incentive policies: Innovation subsides, inclusion new drugs in the health insurance plan, and the combination of the above two policies(also called hybrid policy). Our analysis shows that innovation subsidies and inclusion of new drugs in the health insurance plan can both promote pharmaceutical innovation, but their incentive effects vary in different policy objectives. Specifically, if the regulator aims to improve patient welfare, he should incorporate new drugs into the health insurance plan to expand the accessibility of new drug when the copayment level is low. However, if the regulator aims to improve social welfare, he should choose innovation subsidies when the copayment level is high, and the hybrid policy when the copayment level is low. In particular, with a sufficiently low copayment level, the hybrid policy allows the new drug producer, patients and the regulator to achieve Pareto improvement due to a lower regulator’s innovation subsidy expenditure, higher profits of the new drug producer and consumer surplus.展开更多
Given consumers’trade-offs between conventional economic and environmental attributes of products,we provide a game-theoretic model to explore the role of GTA strategy in duopoly competition by incorporating two sali...Given consumers’trade-offs between conventional economic and environmental attributes of products,we provide a game-theoretic model to explore the role of GTA strategy in duopoly competition by incorporating two salient features:Two product types—The green product produced by a firm with GTA strategy and the ordinary product produced by a firm without GTA strategy,and two consumer segments,i.e.,the green consumers who are willing to pay for green products and the ordinary consumers who are willing to pay for ordinary products.Our analysis shows that GTA strategy may either increase or decrease the green firm’s quality provision.The subtle relationship between the green firm’s quality strategy and GTA strategy not only affects its own equilibrium performances but its rival’s.We also find that two consumer segments may be better off in the presence of a lower GTA intensity.Additionally,although the GTA strategy benefits the environment,the GTA investment is not the more the better.Finally,we find that GTA strategy would lead to higher social welfare only when the GTA efficiency is high enough.Our work not only provides an alternative economic explanation why some firms choose to implement GTA strategy and some do not in reality,but gives managerial insights for firms with different GTA strategies as well as policy insights for the social planner.展开更多
文摘Managing supply chain partnerships for competitive advantage is receiving considerable recognition among both academic researchers and industry executives. Trust is an essential factor for a company to collaborate with its partner through supply chain （SC）. In this paper we analyze the factors of trust relationship in green supply chain （GSC）. A conceptual model of determinants of trust in GSC is presented. Finally, research propositions are discussed.
基金Supported by the National Social Science Fund of China(16BGL079)。
文摘The investment in green technology in the process of product design and production is viewed asa powerful tool for sustainable development and carbon emission reduction However,the substantial cost and pressure of competition weaken incentives for manufacturers to engage in green technology.In this paper,we consider two competitive manufacturer-retailer supply chains,where each manufacturer sells partially substitutable products through the exclusive retailer,study green technology investment selection by manufacturers,and examine the efficacy of retailer cost sharing scheme.Our analysis shows that a dominant equilibrium strategy for both manufacturers is to invest in green technologies,whether cost sharing is in place or not.Retailer sharing the cost of manufac turer green technology investment can avoid firms'preference confliction over the green technology investment and improve social welfare simultaneously when both the cost-sharing rate and the degree of product/channel competition are relatively low.We also find that green technology investment by manufacturers does not necessarily curb total carbon emission,and the cost sharing can either strengthen or weaken the carbon emission reduction of green technology investment.
文摘With increasing public environmental awareness,green activities in retail and distribution processes have become crucial tools for retailers to boost demand and enhance competitiveness.This study develops an analytical model to study the green investment choices of two differentiated retailers dealing with a common green manufacturer.It also explores the impacts of these investment choices on the manufacturer's operational decisions,channel efficiency,consumer welfare,and the environment.We derive three main results.First,the powerful retailer always favors green investments,whereas the less powerful(inferior)retailer may either prefer or avoid green investments.The fiercer the interretailer competition,the lower the willingness of the inferior retailer to introduce green investments.Second,although all supply chain parties may disagree on their preferences for retailers'green investments,a bilateral green investment(i.e.,both retailers make green investments)can reach an incentive alignment for all firms if the differentiation between retailers is low enough and the competition between them is not substantially fierce.Moreover,a bilateral green investment improves consumer welfare and channel efficiency because of the great demand expansion and double marginalization reduction.Third,the retailers'green investments can motivate the manufacturer to produce greener products,but they do not necessarily benefit the environment.We show that the supply chain's economic sustainability aligns with its environmental sustainability only if the environmental improvement efficiency of green investments is substantially high.We further examine the impact of retailers with differentiated green investment abilities and the manufacturer's green investment efficiency to verify the robustness of the main results.
基金Supported by the National Social Science Fund of China(18BGL045)。
文摘A critical problem plaguing regulators in promoting pharmaceutical innovation is to design and select efficient incentive policies. In this study, we develop a stylized model comprising a regulator and two representative drug producers to evaluate the effects of three incentive policies: Innovation subsides, inclusion new drugs in the health insurance plan, and the combination of the above two policies(also called hybrid policy). Our analysis shows that innovation subsidies and inclusion of new drugs in the health insurance plan can both promote pharmaceutical innovation, but their incentive effects vary in different policy objectives. Specifically, if the regulator aims to improve patient welfare, he should incorporate new drugs into the health insurance plan to expand the accessibility of new drug when the copayment level is low. However, if the regulator aims to improve social welfare, he should choose innovation subsidies when the copayment level is high, and the hybrid policy when the copayment level is low. In particular, with a sufficiently low copayment level, the hybrid policy allows the new drug producer, patients and the regulator to achieve Pareto improvement due to a lower regulator’s innovation subsidy expenditure, higher profits of the new drug producer and consumer surplus.
基金the National Social Science Fund of China(16BGL079)。
文摘Given consumers’trade-offs between conventional economic and environmental attributes of products,we provide a game-theoretic model to explore the role of GTA strategy in duopoly competition by incorporating two salient features:Two product types—The green product produced by a firm with GTA strategy and the ordinary product produced by a firm without GTA strategy,and two consumer segments,i.e.,the green consumers who are willing to pay for green products and the ordinary consumers who are willing to pay for ordinary products.Our analysis shows that GTA strategy may either increase or decrease the green firm’s quality provision.The subtle relationship between the green firm’s quality strategy and GTA strategy not only affects its own equilibrium performances but its rival’s.We also find that two consumer segments may be better off in the presence of a lower GTA intensity.Additionally,although the GTA strategy benefits the environment,the GTA investment is not the more the better.Finally,we find that GTA strategy would lead to higher social welfare only when the GTA efficiency is high enough.Our work not only provides an alternative economic explanation why some firms choose to implement GTA strategy and some do not in reality,but gives managerial insights for firms with different GTA strategies as well as policy insights for the social planner.
