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论人形机器人的共享人格

On the Shared Personality of Humanoid Robots
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摘要 人生而享有人格权,是法律关系的主体。人形机器人没有自在自为的意志和理性,不能享有独立的人格权,是法律关系的客体。人是目的,人形机器人只是实现目的的手段。人形机器人与权利人之间存在“共享人格”的关系。人形机器人与人的相似程度越高、参与社会关系的程度越深,与权利人“共享人格”的程度就越高。人格权是支配权,权利人有权支配人格要素,定制、使用具有特定人格要素的人形机器人。但是,人格要素又具有较强的精神属性,不是普通的身外财物。法律有必要规定人格要素的合理支配规则,明确权利人支配、使用人格要素不得损害人的尊严和自由,不得损害社会公共利益。 Human beings are born with personality rights and constitute subjects in legal relationships.Humanoid robots do not possess autonomous will or rationality and therefore cannot enjoy independent personality rights;they are objects of legal relations.Humans are ends in themselves,while humanoid robots are merely means to achieve those ends.A relationship of“shared personality”exists between humanoid robots and their right-holders.The higher the degree of resemblance between a humanoid robot and a human,and the deeper its involvement in social relationships,the higher the degree of“shared personality”with the right-holder.Personality rights are rights of dominion,granting the right-holder the authority to dispose of personality elements and to customize or use humanoid robot that embodies specific personality traits.However,personality elements possess strong spiritual attributes and are not ordinary external property.It is therefore necessary for the law to establish reasonable rules for the control of personality elements,clarifying that the right-holder’s exercise and use of these elements must not infringe upon human dignity and freedom,nor harm the public interests.
作者 董梦晔 Dong Mengye
机构地区 南京大学法学院
出处 《江西社会科学》 北大核心 2025年第12期192-205,208,共15页 Jiangxi Social Sciences
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