摘要
上市公司关键人风险防范和治理与资本市场健康发展紧密相关。现有文献对上市公司关键人职场内风险事件进行了广泛研究,而较少关注其职场外失德行为。本文基于筛选理论考察了关键人职场外失德行为对上市公司组织结构和公司经营绩效的筛选效应。研究结果表明:(1)投资者(包括外部投资者、全体股东、核心大股东)接收关键人失德行为信号后会作出相应的筛选反应:股票短期和中期收益显著为负;股东会促进核心管理层的调整;股权结构重新洗牌。(2)关键人职场外失德行为的曝光最终导致公司经营绩效下降。(3)高质量的内部控制和较低的代理成本将有效缓解关键人职场外失德行为曝光对公司绩效的负面冲击。可见,职场外失德行为引发了不可忽视的上市公司关键人风险,引起投资者的消极筛选效应并负向冲击公司经营业绩,但是高质量的公司治理有助于降低关键人风险所带来的负面影响。
The public image of key persons of listed companies constitutes a significant component of the company's reputation.The existing literature has extensively discussed the effects of on the-job behaviors of listed companies'key persons,but largely ignores the off-the-job behaviors.Such kinds of behaviors can lead to key person risk,which refers to the disproportionate negative impacts on the company's operations and market value due to the presence,absence,or actions of key persons,such as controlling shareholders,actual controllers,or senior management.The exposure of key-person indiscretion constitutes key-person risk.Prevention and governance of key person risks of listed companies are crucial to the sound development of the capital market.According to the screening theory,due to information asymmetry,investors can judge the inner characters of key persons through observable actions,qualifications,and other explicit screening indicators,thereby adjusting their investment decisions.Therefore,this paper examines the screening effects of key-person risks arising from the exposure of key persons'indiscretions,specifically how the listed company and investors are negatively impacted by the off the job indiscretions of key persons and explores whether high quality corporate governance can mitigate these negative impacts.This paper manually collects 83 off the-job indiscretions of key persons of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2021.Based on the screening theory,it examines how the behavior of investors(including external investors,all shareholders,and core major shareholders)and corporate performance are impacted by the exposure of these incidents.The findings indicate that:(1)The investors conduct screening reactions upon receiving the signal of off the-job behaviors of key persons.The market reaction is negative to the news on the key persons'indiscretions both in the short term and medium term;shareholders promote the management turnover and the adjustment of ownership structure.(2)The exposure of key persons'indiscretion leads to a decline in the company's operating performance.(3)The negative impact of key persons'indiscretion on company performance was significantly alleviated in companies with higher internal control quality and lower agency costs.Therefore,off the job indiscretion poses a key-person risk that should not be overlooked,and affects the performance of listed companies,but high quality corporate governance helps mitigate these negative impacts.The contributions of this paper are as follows.Firstly,this paper explores the screening effects of the exposure of key persons'off the-job behaviors from the perspectives of investors and in terms of operational performance based on the Chinese context.This enriches the literature on executive behavior and extends the application scenarios of screening theory.Secondly,whereas previous studies have focused on how specific traits or behaviors of key persons affect their on the-job behaviors and thereby influence corporate operations,they have largely ignored the importance of key persons'personal integrity as a productivity force.Unlike prior research based on on the-job behaviors,this paper provides empirical evidence related to the economic consequences of key person's off the job indiscretions.Thirdly,this study expands the corporate misconduct literature from the perspective of key persons'off the job behaviors.Lastly,the findings of this paper hold significant practical implications for both corporations and regulatory authorities.Listed companies should pay close attention to reputation management for their key persons,while regulatory bodies should supervise the behaviors of these key persons outside the workplace.
作者
徐嘉倩
徐莉萍
刘雯畅
辛宇
Jiaqian Xu;Liping Xu;Wenchang Liu;Yu Xin(School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies;School of Business,Sun Yat sen University;Strategy Department,Mobvista Technology Co.,Ltd.)
出处
《管理学研究》
2025年第4期106-133,199,200,共30页
Advanced Management Studies
基金
广东省基础与应用基础研究基金《上市公司关键人职场外失德行为的经济后果及有效治理研究》(2025A1515012232)的资助。
关键词
失德问题
关键人风险
筛选理论
公司治理
off-the-job indiscretions
key-person risk
screening theory
corporate governance
