摘要
本文利用1995～2002年我国上市公司CEO更换的数据,实证分析和比较了国有和民营控股上市公司的绩效考核机制。研究发现:对于国有控股上市公司而言,资产周转率与CEO更换负相关,权益乘数与CEO更换正相关,利润边际与CEO更换不相关;而对于民营控股上市公司而言,利润边际与CEO更换负相关,其余两个绩效因子与CEO更换不相关。本文认为,国有和民营控股上市公司的目标函数以及监督激励不同是造成两者绩效考核机制存在差异的主要原因,而对利润边际的重视程度不同是区分国有和民营控股上市公司绩效机制的一个重要指标。
Based on the CEO turnover data from year 1995 to 2002, this study empirically investigates and compares the performance evaluation mechanism between state--controlling listed companies and private-controlling listed companies. We find that： （1） for state--controlling listed companies, CEO turnover is related negatively to ratio of asset turnover and positively to the ratio of profit margin but not the ratio of equity multiplier; （2） for private--controlling listed companies, CEO turnover is only related negatively to the ratio of profit margin but has no relation with the ratios of asset turnover and equity multipli- er. We can attribute the difference in the performance evaluation mechanism between state-- and private-- controlling companies to the different objective functions and monitoring incentives of these two types of shareholders. We further show that the relation between CEO turnover and profit margin is an important performance evaluation feature that distinguishes between the private--and state--owned companies.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第2期49-56,共8页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词
CEO更换
终极产权
经营绩效
CEO turnover
ultimate ownership
performance measure
