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现金的市场价值——基于中国上市公司的实证研究 被引量:38

The Market Value of Cash:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
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摘要 使用1998年-2004年沪深两市上市公司的非平衡面板数据,采用全样本固定效应回归模型,结合中国的制度和治理背景检验上市公司所持现金的价值。结果表明企业已持现金的价值存在折价,其边际价值仅为0.5元-0.6元。为了更具体地检验假设。对融资约束、成长机会、控制权性质(国有控股或非国有控股)、企业所在地的市场化程度这几个方面进行了分层研究。实证结果表明,在企业特征方面,持有现金较少的企业、财务杠杆较低的企业、面临融资约束的企业或者具有较高成长机会的企业在继续增持现金时,股东对增持的额外现金给予了较高的价值评价,而非国有控股企业所持有的额外现金也具有更高的价值,这些结果与假设一致,并具有一定的稳健性;在市场化进程的影响方面,当地市场化程度较高的企业所持有的现金具有更高的价值,这与理论假设不一致。 Using the unbalanced panel data of Chinese listed companies during 1998 - 2004, this paper in- vestigates the market value of cash held by the Chinese listed companies under the China's institutions and governance structure. The fix effect regression results using full sample shows the value of a marginal yuan of existing cash to be 0.5-0.6, below the par value of cash. In order to test the hypothesis carefully, the paper also studies different sub-sample in terms of financial constraints, growth opportunities, nature of control rights (state or non-state owned enterprises ) and regional market development. The empirical results show that the additional cash held by those firms which have less existing cash, or lower financial leverage, or higher financial constraints, or higher growth opportunities will be more valued. In addition, the result shows the value of additional cash held by non-state owned enterprises will also be higher. These empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis and have the robustness. In opposition to what is expected, results report that the value of additional cash held by those firms located in higher market development district will also be higher.
出处 《管理科学》 CSSCI 2008年第4期96-104,共9页 Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金(70772079) 教育部人文社会科学项目(07JA630023) 2007年度中山大学笹川优秀青年奖学基金 广东省软科学重点项目(2007A070200008)
关键词 现金的市场价值 融资约束 成长机会 控制权性质 市场化进程 market value of cash financial constraints growth opportunities nature of control rights marketdevelopment
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