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公司治理中的代理问题及对策分析

Agency problem and its countermeasure analysis of corporate governance
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摘要 公司治理研究所有权与经营权分离情况下的"代理人问题",其焦点在于使所有者与经营者利益尽可能相一致。在对管理者和股东之间的利益冲突、债权人与股东的利益冲突分析的基础上,提出了代理问题的一般解决方法并指出公司治理研究的未来发展方向。 Corporate governance studies agency problems under the situations of separation between ownership and managerial right, with its focus on the identity of interest between the owners and the managers. This paper puts forward general soulutions to solving agency problem based on analyzing the interest conflicts between managers and shareholders, creditors and shareholders. Furthermore, it points out the future development direction for corporate governance research.
作者 王晓东
出处 《科技与管理》 2004年第6期85-87,共3页 Science-Technology and Management
基金 黑龙江省教育厅海外学人资助项月(1054HZ008)
关键词 公司治理 所有权 经营权 代理人 股东利益 <Keyword>corporate governance agency interest conflict countermeasure
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参考文献4

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  • 2[2]JENSEN M, MECKLING W. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J ].Journal of Financial Economics .1976, (3): 305-360.
  • 3[3]MODIGLIANI F, MILLER M. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment [ J ]. American Economic Review. 1958, 48:261-297.
  • 4[4]MODIGLIANI F, MILLER M. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction [ J ]. American Economic Review. 1963, 53:433.

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